THE GOLDEN HORDE’S SECRET WEAPON

For them, hunting was not merely entertainment but full-fledged combat training, where cohesion and coordination were drilled into each exercise. Units spread out over dozens of kilometers, moving in two wings that were meant to converge simultaneously at a predetermined point. The practice of sharpshooting was also honed during the hunt. Warriors fired in at least three or four directions and at full gallop, since the prey, as a rule, was also in motion. In this way, hunting became part of the military system: it maintained the army’s combat readiness during periods between military campaigns.

The military system created by Chinggis Khan was extremely centralized. The military organization and principles of command were regulated in detail in the YassaiThe Yassa was the legal code of the Mongol Empire, proclaimed by Chinggis Khan, which established laws for governance, military conduct, and social order across the vast territory..

Even before the establishment and rise of the Mongol Empire, nomadic societies had a well-established military doctrine according to which the army was divided into three main parts: the right wing, the left wing, and the center. This model was also preserved in Chinggis Khan’s army. Each unit and each warrior had a strictly defined place in the battle formation.

All able-bodied members of the population were assigned to units of ten, administrative groups that functioned as a type of military registry. During the mobilization of the army, two or three of the most capable warriors from each unit were selected. They received orders, reported to assembly points, and were then organized into units of hundreds and subsequently into thousands.

The hierarchy was strict: a unit of ten was led by a decurion, a hundred by a centurion, and a thousand by a commander of a thousand. Commanders of thousands held a pivotal role as several thousand soldiers were combined into large formations capable of operating independently. These ten-thousand-strong formations were called tumens. In modern terms, they resembled corps capable of conducting autonomous operations across vast territories.

In this respect, the organization of Chinggis Khan’s army closely parallels later European military systems. For instance, the corps structure developed by Napoleon Bonaparte in the nineteenth century was founded on the same principle.

Mongol military campaigns began long before the troops actually set out. Routes for future movements were carefully planned in advance, not in the sense of modern roads, but as paths that ensured access to water sources and, just as importantly, grazing and forage for the horses.

Preparation extended beyond troop movements to include their armament. Equipping the army with first-rate weapons required advanced technology and highly skilled craftsmen. Military operations were centrally organized and carried out on a state-wide scale.

That is why, during the conquests—especially in northern China, Central Asia, and Transoxiana—efforts were made to preserve craftsmen. Blacksmiths, armorers, and other skilled artisans were separated from the rest of the captives. They were either taken to the territory of Mongolia and Central Asia or left in place, but now as subjects of the new state with a specific assignment: to produce weapons and protective equipment for the army.

Following the completion of the Jin campaign—a grueling twenty-three-year war waged by the Mongol Empire against the Jurchen-led Jin dynasty that ended with the destruction of the dynasty, the siege of Kaifeng, and the emperor’s suicide, and which was one of the most demanding periods in the history of the Mongol Empire—it became clear that successful conquests relied not only on military strength but also on capable and trusted commanders. Chinggis Khan entrusted the western front to Jochi, recognizing him as a leader capable of operating independently and far from the imperial center.

One of Jochi’s first missions was an expedition against the MerkitsiThe Merkits were a twelfth-century nomadic confederation defeated by Chinggis Khan after they abducted his wife Börte., long-standing adversaries of Chinggis Khan. In their flight, they had moved from Mongolia to the eastern Desht-i-KipchakiDesht-i-Kipchak is the medieval name for the vast Kipchak Steppe that formed the heartland of the Golden Horde., within the territory of present-day Kazakhstan, where they sought refuge among the Kipchak tribes. The Great Khan sent envoys demanding that the Merkits be handed over as his subjects, but no response was received. The objective was then made explicit: to subdue the Merkits. Jochi’s forces crossed nearly the entire territory of Kazakhstan, caught up with the enemy near the Mugodzhar Hills, and decisively defeated them.

However, an unexpected episode soon unfolded. Literally a day or two after their victory, Jochi’s detachment encountered a KhwarazmianiThe Khwarazmian Empire was a powerful Central Asian state annihilated by Chinggis Khan's invasion in the thirteenth century. army advancing from the south. At the same time, the Khwarazmians were conducting operations against Kipchak groups. It was spring, changing into early summer, and this marked the first meeting of the two armies on the territory of present-day Kazakhstan.

Shortly thereafter, the first clash with the southward-moving Khwarazmian forces took place. Jochi sought to avoid direct confrontation and proposed peace negotiations, but Muhammad II of Khwarazm refused any compromise. The battle was intense and lasted several days, yet neither side achieved a decisive victory.

At night, Jochi’s detachment lit campfires to create the illusion of continued presence, then quietly withdrew to a considerable distance. The following day, the Khwarazmians discovered that the enemy was gone. After such a hard-fought battle, they no longer had the strength—or the will—to pursue.

Only after the campaigns against the state of Western Xia (also known as Xi Xia) and the TangutsiThe tanguts were a tribal confederation in northeastern or northwestern China/Mongolia. and the completion of the Jin campaign did the Chinggisids fully confront the realities of siege warfare for the first time. It was then that a crucial lesson became clear: in wars against major states, victories in the open field alone were not enough. In the territory of what is now China, the Mongols were forced to deal with large cities and powerful fortresses that could not be taken without careful preparation.

Siege and battering equipment, including catapults, was crucial to Mongol warfare. However, building and operating such machinery required skilled specialists and advanced technologies. To meet this need, the Mongols deliberately recruited experts from conquered peoples, particularly Tangut, Jin, and Khitan engineers from northern China. It is important to note that the Mongols did not transport ready-made siege engines. Instead, they carried knowledge, which enabled them to adapt to diverse conditions and conduct sieges far from their home bases.

The assaults on certain cities were particularly brutal. Sources report fortresses being captured with massive civilian casualties, and archaeological evidence suggests that the losses numbered in the hundreds, and in some cases, even thousands. Yet, not all fortresses could be taken, even with siege equipment. In Europe—particularly the central and western regions—cities were often built behind stone walls of great height and thickness. The Mongols simply bypassed some of these fortifications, avoiding the strain of prolonged sieges, while in other cases, they employed military cunning to achieve their goals.

One of the Mongols’ common military tactics was disinformation. They would spread rumors that their army had lifted the siege and withdrawn, while in reality, they remained hidden in ambush. When the defenders, convinced that the Mongol army had withdrawn, opened the gates, a strike force would burst into the city.

Even if they were recorded in later sources, these accounts reflect actual practices. For example, the siege of the Kyrk‑Yer Fortress on the Crimean PeninsulaiThe Kyrk‑Yer Fortress was the first capital of the independent Crimean Khanate in the fifteenth century. illustrates this approach. Positioned on elevated ground with thick stone walls and a deep moat, the fortress was an extremely difficult target, even for siege engines. As a result, the Mongols relied on psychological tactics to break the defenders’ resolve.

Each night, the Mongols staged elaborate preparations for an assault: they beat war drums and arranged their troops to give the impression of an imminent attack. Yet, the actual assault never came. Over time, the defenders grew complacent, becoming accustomed to this nightly ritual. It was at that precise moment that the Mongols dug a tunnel beneath the wall, through which a strike force of elite warriors, known as bahadurs, suddenly stormed the city.

Another commonly employed tactic involved local allies and collaborators. These intermediaries were sent into the city to convince the defenders that there was no hostile intent. Once the gates were opened, a sudden and decisive assault followed.

One of the most debated episodes in the history of siege warfare is the siege of Caffa and the alleged use of what would today be considered biological weapons. Between 1343 and 1347, the forces of the Golden Horde laid siege to a Genoese port in Crimea. According to contemporary sources, during the siege, the Mongols reportedly catapulted the bodies of plague victims into the city, an action which is believed to have spread the Black Death—the bubonic plague—into Europe. While the precise historical accuracy of this account remains disputed, the episode is firmly rooted in a historical context and reflects the strategic and psychological measures employed in siege warfare.

These events occurred in the fifteenth century, during the reign of Janibek Khan, one of the most powerful khans of the Golden Horde and the son of Uzbek Khan. His rule lasted approximately ten years and coincided with a period of economic prosperity for the Horde, much of which derived from international transit trade. The Crimean Peninsula played a key role in this system, hosting trading posts of Genoese and Venetian merchants from Western Europe.

The conflict that culminated in the siege of Caffa was primarily economic, revolving around the imposition of higher trade duties. The Genoese refused to accept the new terms, escalating the situation into a serious political and military confrontation. As a result, the forces of the Golden Horde approached Caffa and began a prolonged siege. The city could not be taken by force for an extended period. It is in this context that various historical sources report the use of infected bodies: the corpses of people who had died from the plague were allegedly hurled into the city using siege engines.

By this time, the Black Death pandemic had already begun in Eurasia. Outbreaks of the disease were recorded in the 1330s within the territory of the Chagatai Ulus in the region of present-day Kyrgyzstan. Through international trade routes, the disease spread rapidly, encountering virtually no obstacles. The only known measure to combat its spread was burning the deceased.

If the accounts of the residents of Caffa being bombarded with infected corpses reflect actual events, the consequences were catastrophic. Fleeing the epidemic, the city’s inhabitants boarded ships bound for Europe, unknowingly carrying the infection with them. Over the following decades, the plague claimed a significant portion of Europe’s population, triggering one of the most severe demographic crises in its history.

Thus, the siege of Caffa, regardless of the exact historical accuracy of these reports, illustrates the logic of warfare at the time. Contact with the infected within a besieged city was inevitable, and the use of disease as a means of pressure was considered an extreme but acceptable method to compel the enemy to surrender.

Among the Mongol nobility, some women became renowned as warriors. One of the most famous examples is associated with a figure named Kaidu, a descendant of Chinggis Khan, who was a regional ruler and a lifelong adversary of Kublai Khan.

Kaidu’s ulus was located in what is now southeastern Kazakhstan, with its approximate center identified by researchers in the region of present-day Almaty. According to historical sources and later accounts, his daughter Khutulun lived there—a warrior whose fame extended far beyond the steppe. She is even mentioned by Marco Polo, highlighting the widespread recognition of her legendary reputation.

Although Kaidu had around two dozen sons, it was his daughter who truly stood out for her warrior spirit. According to legend, she declared that she would marry only a man who could defeat her in combat. Many suitors tried, but none succeeded. She repeatedly challenged men, demonstrating remarkable strength, agility, and martial skill, completely overturning traditional notions of women’s roles in the military culture of the nomads.

According to tradition, she never married after her father’s death. Instead, she was entrusted with a special responsibility: guarding the family mausoleum, the burial site of the dynasty. In this role, she became a custodian of her family’s memory and resting place, embodying both the qualities of a warrior and those of a sacred protector.

This is just a part of the interview with historian Aibolat Kushkumbaev. Watch the full version on the Qalam History channel.