THE MYSTERY OF NORTH KOREA

From 1960 to 1990, control over the population in North Korea was primarily enforced through two key institutions: the organizational life system (jojik saenghwal) and the people's groups system (inminban). These two independent systems ensured the comprehensive coverage of nearly the entire population, encompassing workplaces, educational institutions, and residential communities. Every Korean aged fourteen or more was a member of both an ‘organization’ (which, though distinct from the workplace, was interconnected) and a designated ‘people's group’.

Historically, the North Korean system was based on Soviet models, but it underwent significant reinterpretation. Many may be familiar with the classic Soviet system, consisting of the Party and its ‘affiliated organizations’, which were public organizations. This principle laid the foundation for ‘organizational life’ in North Korea.

Each North Korean is a member of one of five organizations—Youth Union, Trade Union, Women's Union, Peasants' Union, and Korean Workers' Party (KWP). In the majority of cases, barring specific and uncommon situations, an individual is limited to being a member of just one organization. This ensures that scenarios like ‘a child having five nannies with none taking responsibility’ can be avoided. For example, a Party member cannot be a member of the Trade Union. More precisely, the ‘organizational life’ of a Korean Workers' Party (KWP) member can only take place within a party cell (a significant departure from Soviet prototypes).

Koreans commenced their organizational life at the age of fourteen, when they joined the North Korean version of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (Komsomol), which underwent several name changes, but here, for simplicity, we will refer to it as the Youth Union. From ages fourteen to thirty, practically every Korean was a member of this union, and the primary organization of the Youth Union, its cell, nurtured individuals spiritually, overseeing their upbringing and monitoring their behavior.

However, upon reaching the age of eighteen, a young Korean had the right to join the Party, though this was a challenging process. For a long time, the opportunity to join the KWP through a simplified procedure was one of the main attractions that drew young Koreans into the army or into the so-called ‘shock brigades of rapid action’.ia militarized organization similar to a construction battalion but not directly subordinate to army leadership It is worth noting that the proportion of party members in North Korea was significant. By the end of Kim Il Sung's rule, they constituted approximately 15 per cent of the entire adult population of the country. To understand this better, during the Brezhnev era in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) made up about 10 per cent of the entire adult population.

Those who couldn't become members of the KWP remained part of the Youth Union until the age of thirty and were assigned to its cell based on their place of study, work, or military service. Upon reaching the age of thirty, non-party Koreans became members of the Trade Union if they worked in industry or members of the Peasants’ Union if they worked in agriculture.

However, there was another category of citizens, housewives,iThe term is still used in North Korea, as opposed to ‘homemakers’ whose numbers fluctuated around 50 per cent of all adult women at that time. They were not overlooked or neglected either: after a woman got married and left her job, she was automatically transferred from the Trade Union to the Women's Union, which specifically united housewives in North Korea—every single one of them. However, even in this case, the Party took precedence. If a housewife was a member of the KWP, she continued her ‘organizational life’ within the Party.

The organizational life consisted of several elements. First, of course, there were regular meetings. In the early stages, when the system was just being introduced during the 1960s, such meetings could be held daily. Still, by the early 1980s, a standard was established where regular cell meetings in any organization were held three times a week. In comparison, in the Soviet Union, party meetings were held once a month on average, and trade union meetings much less frequently. Two of the three weekly meetings were dedicated to ideological and political education. During these meetings, members of the Party (or any of the other organizations) listened to lectures on the international situation and the greatness of the Leader. Occasionally, external lecturers were invited to such events, but more often, local activists delivered them. The theoretical knowledge acquired through such education was also meant to be tested. For example, party members took a written exam twice a year to assess how well they had mastered the material from the previous six months.

Meetings, along with all other activities in organizational life, were held separately for the members of each organization. In other words, party members engaged in political education and mutual criticism in their designated space, while Trade Union members did the same in their respective locations.

However, the most interesting aspect of organizational life was the so-called ‘life assessment meetings’ (saenghwal chonghwa), which were weekly gatherings for mutual criticism and self-criticism. Typically, such meetings took place on Saturdays. Nevertheless, in some cases, mutual criticism sessions were held more frequently, as often as twice a week.

During such meetings, each member of the cell had to stand up and publicly confess their wrongdoings from the past week in about two to three minutes. In North Korea, a clear ritual for this sort of confession was established. Firstly, it was customary to quote the Leader. For example, a person could say ‘The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung said that we all must study well.’ Then, they had to acknowledge the mistakes they had made. For instance, a university student in the Youth Union cell meeting might admit to not completing a laboratory assignment. Following that, a brief self-critique was delivered, such as, ‘I didn't complete the assignment because I miscalculated the time as I hadn't internalized the teachings of the Leader well enough.’ The concise public confession concluded with a promise to rectify the shortcomings in the very near future.

After each individual had expressed themselves in this manner, the phase of self-criticism transitioned into mutual criticism. The process of mutual criticism followed a similar structure: each member of the cell would take turns standing up and criticizing one of their comrades within the same cell who had encountered difficulties. In our hypothetical scenario, one of the student's peers, aware of the incomplete laboratory assignment, would need to state something like: ‘Comrade Pak acted improperly; he failed to complete the laboratory work, though the Great Leader emphasized that we all must study diligently to become faithful soldiers of the Leader and the Party.’

However, self-criticism meetings, in most cases, were a kind of spectacle. Prior to the gathering, its future participants would pre-arrange who would criticize whom and for what specific reasons. The focus of the criticism was directed toward minor and forgivable transgressions, while serious offenses with significant consequences were not confessed here. In other words, an official would not disclose accepting a bribe but might admit to being late for work. Nevertheless, despite the ritualistic and formal nature of these meetings, there was always the threat of conflict arising and serious accusations being leveled against an individual.

So, as demonstrated by many religious groups and sects, these public confessions were quite effective in their own way. They involved cultivating self-control, a constant sword of Damocles hanging over one's head, and living with the fear that an individual’s secrets could become public at any time thanks to an attentive collective. All of this significantly influenced people's behavior.

Another essential component of the system of control over the population was the observation conducted in people's homes. The basis for such monitoring was established by the ‘people's group’, or inminban in Korean. Interestingly, inminbans existed before North Korea was established, and this phenomenon has deep historical roots. Mutual responsibility household groups have existed in East Asia since ancient times, and in Korea, groups for mutual control were formed in the early 1940s under the Japanese colonial administration.

The inminban system has largely survived the crisis of the 1990s, and every citizen in North Korea is assigned to a specific inminban from birth until death. Typically, one inminban includes twenty to thirty families living in close proximity. In the case of a single-story construction area, this is roughly one rural block. In a multi-story residential building, all the apartments in one entrance are usually part of one inminban. The head of the inminban is a bureaucrat, who is always a middle-aged woman.

If, for any reason, a Korean spends the night outside his official place of residence, he is obliged to register where he plans to stay overnight with the head of the inminban. This must be done no later than 10 or 11 p.m. Nowadays, this rule is sometimes overlooked, but until the early 1990s, it was strictly adhered to.

The head of the inminban, according to a common expression in North Korea, must ‘know the number of spoons and chopsticks in each household’. In essence, the official is required to be familiar with all inminban residents (ranging from 50 to 100 people), knowing their workplaces, income, possessions, and overall household situations. Regular visits to the homes and apartments of those under her jurisdiction are mandatory to ensure everything is in order. Scheduled meetings with the local police officer are also part of her responsibilities, where she must report anything suspicious. A crucial aspect of her duties involves registering visitors with the inminban. For instance, anyone staying temporarily within the inminban area or anyone deciding to spend the night with friends or relatives must register in advance with her.

The head of the inminban also participates in ‘housing checks’, nighttime raids that have always been very common in the capital and regime-controlled areas but which occurred much less frequently in smaller towns. During such checks, usually conducted after midnight, a group of police officers cordon off the inminban and then proceed to go through the apartments or houses within the inminban, conducting a superficial search in each of them. The primary goal of these checks is to find out if people are staying there without proper registration, most commonly couples in love. Violations are reported to the places of study or work of those caught. This can lead to a considerable amount of criticism and self-criticism, and given the patriarchal nature of North Korean sexual mores, such incidents can create numerous problems for the women caught in acts of passion.

In the past, during housing checks, authorities aimed to discover foreign literature. Significant emphasis was placed (and continues to be placed) on checking the seals of radios and televisions. In North Korea, all radios officially produced in the country have tuning fixed to the frequencies of official radio stations and it is legal to sell and own only radio equipment with fixed tuning that can exclusively receive state channels. Possessing a radio with free tuning at home is a criminal offense. However, the population of North Korea is generally well educated, and local craftsmen know how to modify a receiver with blocked tuning. Therefore, all such equipment is sealed, and the integrity of the seals is checked during raids.

In the 1960s, extremely strict control over internal travel was introduced. Since then, to travel outside the province in which a North Korean citizen was registered, a special permit had to be obtained and presented. This permit was issued by the local authorities in coordination with the head of the traveler’s inminban and the administration at their place of work or study.

Being outside one's province without proper permission is considered an administrative offense. During Kim Il Sung's time, this permit had to be presented when purchasing train or intercity bus tickets. Since the 1990s, this rule is still theoretically applicable but is not practically enforced.

Special, and much more complex, rules applied to trips to border areas or to Pyongyang. To enter these regions, one had to obtain permission directly from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the capital, and obtaining this permission was rather challenging.

A characteristic feature of the model of North Korean society during Kim Il Sung's lifetime was an extremely cautious approach to trade. Kim Il Sung repeatedly expressed the view that the distribution system using ration cards is much fairer than ordinary commercial trade. Considering the role that traditional peasant views played in the emergence of the North Korean state, there is nothing surprising about this approach. A cautious and sometimes outright hostile attitude toward commerce has always been an important part of the peasant worldview, and egalitarian distribution is the embodiment of justice to traditional peasants.

For most, the phrase ‘ration card system’ induces a persistent allergy, and the very existence of a card-based distribution system is perceived as a serious deviation from the norms associated with poverty, war, and other extraordinary circumstances. However, for North Koreans, who lived under a total card system for almost forty years, this system doesn't elicit such a negative reaction. It was (and is) perceived differently than, for example, by residents of the former Soviet Union. North Koreans viewed the card system not as a restriction of their consumer freedom but rather as a unique form of social security.

The prices of goods distributed within the framework of the card system were generously subsidized by the state. For the residents of North Korea, the card system was an essential part of the unwritten contract between the government and society. North Koreans who grew up during the time of Kim Il Sung were confident that the state was simply obligated to regularly provide every member of society with a basic set of products and consumer goods at a symbolic price. In return, it was implicit that the recipient of these benefits had to work for the state.

As we have seen, under Kim Il Sung’s leadership, the state guaranteed all members of society a basic set of products and consumer goods at a nominal cost. Since the number of goods that could, in theory, be freely purchased with money remained extremely limited, salaries were perceived (and often treated) as pocket money, to be used for books, stationery, or cinema tickets. The best analogy to this situation would be the military, where a soldier serves the country and is provided with the necessities of life for free and receives a little money for personal expenses on top of that.

In reality, during Kim Il Sung's time, the country operated several separate and often independent distribution systems. Broadly speaking, there was the national state grain distribution system, which was centrally controlled and exclusively responsible for distributing grains such as rice, corn, and wheat, as well as flour and pasta (the baegeup system). Additionally, there were local distribution systems that operated independently under the jurisdiction of provincial, county, or city authorities, managing the distribution of other food products (excluding grains) and everyday goods (the gonggeup system).

The grain ration card system was initially introduced in 1946, applying only to employees of state enterprises and institutions. By the mid-1950s, according to Soviet embassy data, grain was distributed through ration cards to 3–3.4 million people, representing the majority of the population. After the collectivization in North Korea in December 1957, the free trade of grain was prohibited. From that point, grains could only be distributed through the ration card system, and the private trading of grains was declared a criminal offense. This ban was enforced until the late 1980s.

As mentioned earlier, the prices of grains and cereals distributed through ration cards were maintained at an exceptionally low level by the government. For many decades, one kilogram of rice obtained using a ration card cost 0.08 won. During this time, the average monthly salary increased from approximately 50 to about 100 won.

Every resident of North Korea had the right to a clearly defined (and almost free) grain ration. The norms in the grain distribution system (baegeup) were uniform across the country. The size of the grain ration depended on the type of work the recipient was engaged in. The largest ration, 900 grams of grains per day, was intended for those involved in heavy physical labor (steelworkers, miners, loggers, et cetera). The majority of workers and office employees were entitled to a daily ration of 700 grams of grains. Students and high school students received 500–600 grams per day, while primary school students, depending on their age, were allocated 300–400 grams. Pensioners were also entitled to 300 grams of grains. It's worth noting that, theoretically, these norms still apply today, but in practice, over the past three decades, only a minority of the population continues to receive rations.

In cities, grain rations were distributed twice a month. On the designated day, a representative of the family (usually the housewife) would go to the grain distribution center assigned to their family. There, they would present their identification, hand over their ration cards, pay the required amount, and receive the family's food for the next two weeks. Essentially, even farmers relied on ration cards. The grain distribution norms in rural areas were the same as in cities, but the ration was distributed not twice a month but once a year, in the fall, after the harvest.

In Russia, there was often sympathetic talk about the ‘poor North Koreans’ who supposedly ‘ate only rice’. It must be said that North Koreans themselves would find this amusing. Under Kim Il Sung, during and after his rule, rice in North Korea was a food for the elite, available to ordinary people only on special occasions. Incidentally, this also applied to South Korea, where rice became a staple only in the 1970s.

In North Korea during Kim Il Sung's era, the standard grain ration consisted of a mixture of various grains. While the size of the ration was the same across the country, the proportions of rice and other less valuable grains varied significantly. In the more prestigious areas, the share of rice could be much higher, reaching 60 to 70 per cent in the prosperous 1970s in Pyongyang. However, even during those times, in remote regions of the country, the card ration was almost entirely composed of corn and barley, with the share of rice being as low as 10 to 15 per cent.

At first glance, a 700-gram grain ration per day may seem generous, but it's important to remember that all other products were distributed in very small quantities (for example, the ration of meat was only a few kilograms per year), and only a few people engaged in commercial trade. On the other hand, in North Korea at that time, nobody was truly starving, although only officials could boast round bellies (and such a belly, by the way, was considered a sign of success).

However, the economic situation in North Korea began to deteriorate around 1970, and this immediately affected grain rations. The first reduction in rations occurred in 1973, when it was announced that ‘due to complications in the international situation’, the ration would be cut. Every two weeks, two daily rations would be redirected to create strategic reserves. In 1989, the rations were reduced again by 10 per cent and another 10 per cent in 1992, but by that time, the system created by Kim Il Sung was already starting to collapse.

The system for supplying ‘auxiliary’ food items and basic consumer goods was more complex. Although Kim Il Sung mentioned several times that, ideally, it would be good to create a nationwide system of rationed distribution for these goods, in practice, the North Korean government never achieved this. Products such as salty soy sauce, cabbage and other vegetables, fish, and meat were distributed by local authorities at the city or county level (equivalent to a district). Similarly, clothing and shoes, soap, toothpowder, and some other essential goods were under the jurisdiction of local authorities.

The distribution norms for these products and goods varied significantly depending on the region and could change quite drastically over time. How many pairs of socks or liters of soy sauce a resident of a particular county would receive in a given year was dependent on the ability of local authorities to obtain the required quotas from the central government. If the local leadership managed to secure quotas for several dozen tons of frozen pollock, it would be distributed in substantial quantities through the ration cards. If not, the population had to do without fish (or, for example, without socks), or they had to purchase these items in the market.

Some things also depended on local geography. For example, if a county had a poultry farm, its residents would receive a considerable number of eggs through their ration cards. In coastal counties, there were usually no issues with fish, but only a few dozen kilometers inland, fish often became a scarce commodity. Meat (only pork) was distributed four to five times a year, on holidays, at around half a kilogram per person.

Each family received ‘ration books’, using the old, now-forgotten Soviet-Russian term. A North Korean family had several such books (more like cards made of thick paper) because each store issued its own ration book, which was used to control the purchase of consumer and food products distributed through the local ration card system.

In addition, North Koreans were occasionally issued special coupons based on where they lived. These coupons gave the recipient the right to purchase certain items in a state-owned store, but they were sold at a very high price (all goods, both in the centralized and local ration distribution system, were subsidized and sold cheaply).

Residence-based coupons were issued when particularly scarce and rare items were brought to local trade, such as umbrellas or leather shoes (most North Koreans during Kim Il Sung's time wore fabric shoes with rubber soles). Since scarce items were rarely available, it made no sense to include them in the regular distribution system.

For the bureaucratic elite, there were, of course, closed distributors. The lower echelon of the elite shopped at the so-called ‘Distribution Centers No. 65’, where, according to corresponding orders, items that were scarce for the majority, such as leather shoes, were sold. Additional rations for the higher-ranking officials were delivered directly to their homes, but both the deputy minister and the Central Committee instructor received supplies according to clear norms, which were more or less uniform for all officials of the corresponding level. In particular, male managerial workers were entitled to filtered cigarettes, while the common people smoked regular cigarettes. Of course, ordinary Koreans knew about this, but it seems that the privileges of the bureaucracy (which were quite moderate by the standards of most countries) did not evoke much protest from them.

A distinctive form of incentivized distribution was the so-called ‘Gifts of the Great Leader’, referring to Kim Il Sung.iand from the 1980s, ‘Gifts of the Beloved Leader’, indicating Kim Jong Il, were included Typically, prestigious consumer items such as imported fruits, televisions, and watches were distributed. Usually, those who distinguished themselves in production received these gifts, but there were cases when gifts were given to all personnel of a particular enterprise or even to all residents of a city. This was often used to emphasize the special character of a given city or enterprise.

For instance, in April 1982, in Hoeryong, a town on the border with China and the hometown of Kim Jong Suk, the mother of Kim Jong Il and the wife of Kim Il Sung, active preparations were underway to celebrate her anniversary. On this occasion, all families in the city received Soviet Rocket and Slava watches as ‘Gifts of the Great Leader’. In December that year, for the birthday of the Mother of the Nation, Kim Jong Suk, everyone in the city was given imported blankets. The people were amazed by this generosity, took pride in their status, and still remember these blankets and watches to this day.