Let us then have a closer look at how the Uprising unfolded in the two oblasts with the majority Kazakh population, where the events of 1916 took their most dramatic course – the Turgai oblast of the Steppe Governor-Generalship (part of the present-day Akmola and Qostanai oblasts of Kazakhstan) and the Semirech’e oblast of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship (part of the present-day Almaty and Jetysu oblasts).

Before discussing the Uprising, it is crucial to establish the historical context, which created conditions for the large-scale protests that eventually escalated into an open rebellion. The Turkestan and Steppe Governor-Generalships, which encompassed the territories of the present-day Central Asian states, were ruled by the Russian Empire as colonies, administered by the military, which performed executive and judicial duties. iAlexander Morrison, Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868-1910: A Comparison with British India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 126.The native population of the colonies was classified as inorodtsy due to their non-Orthodox faith and non-Slavic background. The category of inorodtsy was very broad and included peoples as diverse as Kazakh nomads and Jewish city-dwellers. There were, however, significant differences between Muslim inorodtsy of Central Asia and other groups like Jews. The Muslim inorodtsy were exempted from military service due to the perceived lack of civic consciousness (grazhdanstvennost’) and patriotism, although many inorodtsy viewed this exemption as a privilege granted by the “White Tsar”. iOn the inorodtsy see John W. Slocum, "Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category of “Aliens” in Imperial Russia," The Russian Review 57, no. 2 (1998); Alexander Morrison, "Metropole, Colony, and Imperial Citizenship in the Russian Empire," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 13, no. 2 (2012). At the same time, the inorodtsy were also deprived of the rights and privileges enjoyed by other subjects of the Russian Empire. The denial of land ownership was likely the most significant consequence of colonial rule for the Central Asian inorodtsy. The imperial legislation converted Kazakh land into state property, making it subject to seizure and redistribution among the arriving Slavic settlers.

By 1912, a staggering 62 million dessiatines of Kazakh land had been transferred to arriving Slavic settlers whose numbers surged to 1,629,200 in 1916. iE. R. Morozova, "Istoriko-Geograficheskie usloviia formirovaniia rossiiskoi diaspory v Respublike Kazakhstan, " Postsovetskie Issledovaniia 2, no. 3 (2019): 1099; N. E. Bekmakhanova, Mnogonatsional'noe naselenie Kazakhstana i Kirgizii v epokhu kapitalizma (60-E Gody XIX v.–1917 g.) (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 103. This dramatic growth in the settler population can be attributed to the emancipation of serfs in 1861 and the subsequent demographic explosion during the latter half of the 19th century. The Kazakh steppe became an attractive destination for freed serfs seeking new opportunities and free land. The influx of colonists further intensified following the Stolypin land reform of 1906, which aimed to address the land shortage crisis in the empire’s European provinces by funnelling the excess population to Siberia and the Kazakh Steppe. The continued resettlement of Russian and Ukrainian peasants on Kazakh lands far surpassed the natural growth of the native nomadic population. Demographic data clearly indicates a significant decline in the share of the Kazakh population both in the Steppe and Turkestan regions. Over a span of less than twenty years, between 1897 and 1914, the proportion of Kazakhs in the total population of the two regions decreased from 74% to 58.5%. i N. V. Alekseenko, Naselenie dorevoliutsionnogo Kazakhstana: Chislennost', razmeschenie, sostav, 1870--1914 gg. (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1981), 83. At the same time, the share of the Slavic population experienced a rise from 12.9% in 1897 to 29.6% in 1914. In the Akmolinsk oblast particularly, the Kazakhs became a minority, with their share plummeting from around two-thirds (61.1%) in 1897 to only about a third (36.6%) in 1914.

The rapid influx of settlers and the seizures of pastureland increasingly made pastoral nomadism unviable. In response to these challenges, a growing number of Kazakhs were forced to engage in seasonal farming during periods when their animals were not being pastured, while others, known as jataqs, had to settle down permanently. By the close of the 19th century, 32,2% of Kazakhs were involved in farming in the Akmolinsk oblast, while in the Semipalatinsk oblast, 19.7% of the native population grew crops. Meanwhile in the Turgai and Ural’sk oblasts, these figures were 11.3% and 22.2% respectively. The cultivation of land did not, however, safeguard it from being seized by the colonial authorities. In fact, the Resettlement Administration showed a clear preference for native lands that were already irrigated or deemed suitable for agriculture. To give just one example, in 1910, the Kyrgyz of the Pishpek uezd (present-day Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan) lost 13,000 dessiatines (14,170 hectares) of land that contained “over two thousand winter camps, with good houses and gardens, bee hives, mills, clover fields, ancestral tombs, and a few mosques.”i Kushbek Usenbaev, 1916: Geroicheskie i tragicheskie stranitsy (Bishkek: Sham, 1997), 33.

The persistent encroachment upon native land inevitably sparked frequent conflicts between colonists and nomads, manifesting in fistfights, cattle rustling, and even instances of murder, all of which were routinely documented by colonial administrators. It is evident that the colonization of the Steppe region created a fertile ground for the emergence of a rebellion. However, the growing native resentment at settlers does not account for the timing of the Uprising, as organized mass attacks on government officials and colonists did not occur before 1916. The immediate context of World War I played a crucial role in propelling the simmering discontent into an armed rebellion. The deteriorating wartime economy, the implementation of the labour draft plagued by bureaucratic incompetence and insensitivity of the imperial government towards local conditions, and the callous treatment of the native population by local authorities all contributed to the intensification of previously suppressed grievances, eventually resulting in a violent conflict.

The beginning of World War I put a considerable strain on the native population of the region, exacerbating their already precarious situation. Still reeling from the jut and drought, which hit the western and northern oblasts of the Steppe between 1910 and 1913, Kazakh auyls were now targeted for frequent livestock requisitioning. i S. D. Asfendiiarov, Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe vosstanie 1916 goda v Kazakhstane (Alma-Ata: Kazakhstanskoe kraevoe izdatel'stvo, 1936), 20-21. In 1914 alone, Kazakhs of the Semirech’e and Syr-Darya oblasts of Turkestan supplied a million sheep for the needs of the imperial army. i Tat'iana Kotiukova, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Turkestane: Oshibka vlasti ili istoricheskaia zakonomernost'?," Obozrevatel', no. 8 (2011): 102. As if this were not enough, a wartime tax of three rubles was introduced in addition to raised peacetime taxes. Even more damaging to nomadic households were the shortages of grain. The diversion of grain to the army and the drought that struck Semirech’e in 1916, resulting in a deficit of 22 million poods (over 360,375 tonnes), led settlers who typically sold grain to the Kazakhs to become increasingly reluctant to part with their harvests. At the same time, frequent livestock requisitions left most nomads unable to sell or exchange their remaining animals for grain.

The native population's deepening impoverishment, compounded by the loss of their land and the injustices of colonial rule, made for a tinderbox that could catch fire, but it was the labour draft, announced in the first half of July, that ignited the rebellion. The decision to draft the inorodtsy had been made in May 1916 as a response to the labour shortage caused by the departure of able-bodied men to the frontlines. The Council of Ministers planned to draft 230,000 men aged between 19 and 43 from the Steppe and 250,000 men from Turkestan. i “Razrabotka plana provedeniia mobilizatsii kirgiz voennymi vlastiami kraia, 2 iiulia 1916 g.” in T. R. Ryskulov, ed. Vosstanie 1916 goda v Kirgizstane. Dokumenty i materialy, sobrannye L. V. Lesnoi (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1937). The nomadic region of Semirech’e alone had to provide 60,000 workers, which accounted for 18% of the oblast’s total male population. i “Protokol chastnogo soveshchaniia kirgiz” in A. Chuloshnikov, "K Istorii Vosstaniia Kirgiz V 1916 G.," Krasnyi arkhiv, no. 3 (16) (1926): 58.

The decree was signed by Nicholas II on June 25 and the first announcements of the labour draft were made in the first half of July. The timing of the draft was inopportune, coinciding with preparations for the harvesting season. The wording of the decree also made it clear that the draftees would be transferred to “the area of active service by the army,” where they would be involved in “the installation of defensive constructions and military communications”. i “Tsarskii ukaz o mobilizatsii “inorodcheskogo” naseleniia Astrakhanskoi gubernii, Sibiri i Srednei Azii dlia rabot po ustroistvu oboronitel’nykh sooruzhenii v raione deistvuiushchei armii, 25 iiunia 1916 g.” in E. S. Kaptagaev, ed. Vosstanie 1916 goda v Kyrgyzstane. Sbornik dokumentov (Bishkek: Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv KR, 2011), 6. The translation of the decree into native languages heightened the distrust of the native population. As the report prepared by the future leaders of Alash explains, the Kazakh translation of the decree created an impression that the natives were being conscripted as soldiers and that “they would be taken to the frontlines…without prior military training”. i “Pamiatnaia zapiska o kirgizakh”; “Protokol chastnogo soveshchaniia kirgiz” in Chuloshnikov, "K Istorii Vosstaniia Kirgiz V 1916 G.," 62. That these beliefs were common is evident from the testimonies and reports of the events at the Karkara fair, where the announcement of the draft was met by the indignant cries of the native crowd that “the Tsar fooled us!”. i “Protokol pisaria Kurmanovskoi volosti” in Orazalin R. E., ed. Karkara Kuzhaty: Karkara Koterilisi Muragat Kuzhattarynda (1916-1918 Zh. Zh.) (Almaty: An Arys, 2016), 18. Witness accounts reveal a widespread feeling of distrust among the native population. For instance, a witness named Goriainov recounts that the Kazakhs “did not trust the head [of the volost]” because he “lied to them”. Nor did they “believe that they were being taken for work and not as soldiers to the war”. i “Protokol pogranichnyi starzhnik №6 Tekesskogo posta” in ibid., 55.

Individual announcements made by authorities did little to dispel these beliefs. Adding to the confusion, the governor of Semirech’e declared that native men were being drafted to dig trenches, leading many among the native population to conclude that they would be positioned between enemy lines. Meanwhile, in Turgai, the governor reneged on his earlier promises that Kazakhs were exempt from draft, further exacerbating the sense of panic and anger directed against the authorities. i K. V. Kharlampovich, Vosstanie turgaiskikh kazak-kirgizov v 1916–1917gg. (Kzyl-Orda: Izd. Obshchestvo izucheniia Kazakhstana, 1926).

The first protests broke out as early as the first half of July in the sedentary areas of Turkestan. On July 4, 1916, a sizeable crowd of around 3,000 protesters gathered in front of the city administration in the town of Khojent (now Khujand in northern Tajikistan) in the Samarkand oblast. The following day, a crowd of approximately 2,000 protesters destroyed the lists of recruits. A group of protesters then attacked a punitive detachment sent to disperse the crowd. The protests swiftly spread to nearby towns of Dagbit and Gazy-Uaglyk. Within days, the Samarkand oblast was aflame. By July 9, new protests erupted in Andijan, which later spilled over to Margilan, finally reaching the capital of Turkestan, Tashkent, on July 11.

The events leading up to the rebellion unfolded differently in the Kazakh Semirech’e. The simmering discontent with the draft did not immediately translate into direct confrontations with the authorities. Instead, the Kazakhs of Semirech’e directed their frustrations towards native administrators. With the disturbances in Turkestan unfolding before their eyes, Semirech’e administrators sought to pre-empt protests by arresting and threatening violence against native “agitators”. During the latter part of July, the authorities cracked down on individuals suspected of agitating against the conscription. Numerous arrests were made, with 34 alleged agitators arrested on a single day on July 17 across three volosts of the Verny uezd (now part of Almaty oblast). i Edward D. Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), 118. These arrests frequently took place during official announcements of the draft, adding to the atmosphere of tension and discontent. Official reports of meetings with locals in Semirech’e speak of apprehension and resolve of the Kazakhs to avoid the draft. A report of the scribe of the Alzhansk volost of the Zharkent uezd (part of Almaty oblast today) describes how at one of such meetings, the native attendees “unanimously declared…that they did not wish to implement the draft”. i “Raport pisaria Al’dzhanskoi volosti Dzharkentskogo uezda Komarova nachal’niku Narynkol’skogo uchastka A. Podvarkovu o nevozmozhnosti sostavleniia mobilizatsionnyh spiskov, 11 iiulia” in A. V. Piaskovskii, ed. Vosstanie 1916 Goda V Srednei Azii I Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1960), 324-25.

The first hostilities in Semirech’e occurred in the last week of July, when a group of Kazakhs fleeing the draft opened fire on a border patrol that attempted to apprehend them. The incident at the border was soon followed by clashes in the Kyzylburovsk and Botpaevsk volosts of the Verny uezd between August 3-6. The incident in the Kyzylburovsk volost was caused by the actions of the deputy head of the uezd, Khlynovsky, who took hostage several Kazakh notables to coerce the volost into submitting the lists of recruits within the span of five hours. The volost representatives made repeated appeals to Khlynovsky requesting him to release the hostages and delay the draft. However, tensions escalated when, in an attempt to disperse the increasingly agitated crowd, Khlynovsky fired into the air. Believing this was an order to open fire on the crowd, Khlynovsky’s men shot two Kazakhs. A protester armed with a hunting rifle fired back, killing one of the policemen. Following the incident, a Cossack cavalry squadron and a half-company were despatched to the volost. iIz protokola doprosa mirovym sud’ei 4-go uchastka Cherniaevskogo u. inzhenera M. Tynyshpaeva ob istorii vzaimootnoshenii rossiiskoi vlasti s kazakhami, 5-25 fevralia 1917 g.” in M. K. Koigeldiev, ed. Zhetisu - Ystykkol Kasireti. Kuzhattar Men Materialdar Zhinagy. 1916-1920 Zhzh. (Astana: Gylym, 2016), 180-81.

The second incident in the Botpaevsk volost unfolded in the nearly identical fashion. The arrival of the district police captain Gilev and twenty policemen resulted in the killing of twelve Kazakhs and the despatch of a punitive expedition consisting of a Cossack company, one infantry company, and a settler militia, which murdered indiscriminately on their way to Pishpek. A report by a native official, Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, suggests that indiscriminate murder of the native population was employed even in areas where no disturbances had taken place, such as the Kopal uezd (part of the modern-day Jetysu oblast), where local Cossacks killed 40 Kazakhs. In the Lepsinsk uezd (now part of the Jetysu oblast), the unrest, which claimed no victims among the colonists, led to the killing of 100 Kazakhs and the arrest of another hundred.

These incidents highlight a clear pattern: the use or threat of violence by the authorities often elicited a violent response from the nomads. The efforts to intimidate the native population and suppress any form of opposition to the draft likely convinced many in the native society that they faced a grim choice: either perish on the frontlines fighting the German army, engaged in arduous trench-digging, or face death at the hands of the punitive forces at home. The indiscriminate violence inflicted by the Cossacks and soldiers upon innocent auyls and families, who had neither protested nor participated in the disturbances, lent credibility to the rumours that the authorities harboured a sinister agenda to destroy the nomads. A poignant remark by a Kazakh judge in the Zharkent uezd (part of the modern-day Almaty oblast) that the Muslims would not be “conscripted like sheep taken to slaughter” is a telling testament to these beliefs. i “Raport pisaria Al’dzhanskoi volosti Dzharkentskogo uezda Komarova nachal’niku Narynkol’skogo uchastka A. Podvarkovu o nevozmozhnosti sostavleniia mobilizatsionnyh spiskov, 11 iiulia” in Piaskovskii, Vosstanie 1916 Goda V Srednei Azii I Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov, 325.

Following the incidents in Kyzylburovsk and Botpaevsk volosts, the now rebellious Kazakhs cut off telegraph lines and launched attacks on post relays along the Verny (Almaty) to Pishpek (Bishkek) road. The rebels also made unsuccessful attempts to capture several settler villages, and captured peasants who were working in the fields. i “Vsepodanneishii otchet Voennogo Gubernatora Semirechenskoi oblasti za 1916 god” in Koigeldiev, Zhetisu - Ystykkol Kasireti. Kuzhattar Men Materialdar Zhinagy. 1916-1920 Zhzh., 151. Between August 10 and 11, the rebels laid siege to the village of Saratovskoe, before being forced to retreat by the advancing punitive forces. i “Donesenie vr. i. d. nachal’nika Lepsinskogo uezda A. A. Maslova v Vernenskii okruzhnoi sud o vosstanii v uezde” in Piaskovskii, Vosstanie 1916 Goda V Srednei Azii I Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov, 392. On August 13, the Kazakhs of the Zhailmyshevsk volost in the Verny uezd made an attempt to engage a Cossack detachment, but were ultimately dispersed. i “Dokladnaia zapiska i. d. voennogo gubernatora Semirechenskoi oblasti A. I. Alekseeva general-gubernatoru Turkestanskogo kraia A. N. Kuropatkinu o prichinakh I khode vosstaniia v oblasti” in ibid., 372. In the Zharkent uezd, the rebels targeted and destroyed the villages of Novo-Afonskoe and Spitsevskoe, along with several settler farms in the Karkara area. i “Vsepodanneishii otchet Voennogo Gubernatora Semirechenskoi oblasti za 1916 god” in Koigeldiev, Zhetisu - Ystykkol Kasireti. Kuzhattar Men Materialdar Zhinagy. 1916-1920 Zhzh., 158.

The sequence of events leading to the uprising in the Turgai oblast paralleled those that occurred in Semirech'e. Following the announcement of the draft, Kazakhs of Turgai sent a delegation to Petrograd with the request to delay the mobilization. i V., Vosstanie Turgaiskikh Kazak-Kirgizov V 1916–1917gg, 19-20. Meanwhile, the local authorities were keen to ensure the timely implementation of the draft and restore the order. The events that unfolded in Turkestan and Semirech’e likely impressed on some imperial officials the importance of acting with urgency and ruthlessness at any hint of unrest. Acting upon rumours and reports of assaults and killings of native administrators responsible for compiling the recruitment lists, colonial officials often resorted to violence to expedite the submission of the lists. Thus, a detachment, led by captain Tkachenko in late August, unleashed a wave of destruction upon Kazakh settlements. Native eyewitness testimonies describe widespread atrocities, including mass rapes, brutal beatings, looting, and the deliberate torching of Kazakh villages carried out by the punitive forces. i “Iskak Al’sugurov, Tokat Tleulin: Torgovets i syn ishana” in Timofeev N. D., ed. Vosstanie 1916 Goda V Kazakhstane (Alma-Ata: Kazgosizdat, 1937), 70-71. By Tkachenko’s own admission, the nomads fled in terror “as if they were mad” at the sight of the advancing Russian forces. i “Iz dnevnika Ia. Dovbischenko o polozhenii v osazhdennom Turgae” in Piaskovskii, Vosstanie 1916 Goda V Srednei Azii I Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov, 587.

The initial disturbances of September soon gave way to a brief period of relative calm, abruptly shattered in late October. The likely explanation for the lull in the months preceding the uprising is that the Turgai Kazakhs organised and prepared for armed resistance. They mobilized men, forged weapons, and pooled resources. Indeed, the available archival evidence suggests that the Turgai rebels had higher level of organisation and coordination compared to their kin in Semirech’e. Notably, the Turgai rebels established two distinct de-facto armies, which consisted primarily of Argyn and Qypshaq tribesmen, and had military commanders. One of these commanders, Amangeldy Imanov, was immortalized in the Soviet historiography of the uprising. The Turgai rebels also had political leadership; Amangeldy commanded the army of Abdulgafar Janbosynov, elected as the khan of the Qypshaq tribe. The Argyn rebels were led by Ospan Chulakov. i V., Vosstanie Turgaiskikh Kazak-Kirgizov V 1916–1917gg, 12. The two armies counted up to 8,000 combatants who were primarily armed with melee weapons along with a few hunting rifles.

The actions of the Turgai rebels closely mirrored those in Semirech’e. To impede the advance of the punitive forces, the Turgai rebels destroyed a 160-verst (170-kilometre) stretch of the road i “Iz dnevnika Ia. Dovbischenko o polozhenii v osazhdennom Turgae”; “Telegramma vitse-gubernatora Turgaiskoi oblasti S. N. Obukhova komanduiuschemu voiskami Kazanskogo voennogo okruga A. G. Sandetskomu o neobkhodimosti vysylki voisk dlia bor’by s vosstavshimi, blokirovavshimi g. Turgai”; “Iz zhurnala voennykh deistvii Turgaiskogo otriada karatel’noi ekspeditsii general-leitenanta Lavrent’eva” in Piaskovskii, Vosstanie 1916 Goda V Srednei Azii I Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov, 589, 95, 603. that connected Turgai with the town of Irgiz and the postal relays along the road. In contrast to the Semirech’e rebels, however, the rebels of Turgai were better organized. The high level of organization among the rebels becomes apparent when examining the reports of their confrontations with the punitive forces. When in battle, the rebels marched in “military formation,” advancing “in columns” and launching coordinated attacks “in waves”. i “Telegramma komanduiuschego voiskami Kazanskogo voennogo okruga A. G. Sandetskogo nachal’niku General’nogo shtaba P. I. Aver’ianovu o khode vosstaniia v Turgaiskoi oblasti i o boiakh karatel’nogo otriada s vosstavshimi” in ibid., 610. They displayed remarkable bravery, launching attacks “despite the weapon fire” and fought with “fanaticism”. i “Vsepoddaneishaia dokladnaia zapiska nachal’nika General’nogo shtaba P. I. Aver’ianova i nachal’nika Glavnogo shtaba M. I. Zankevicha Nikolaiu II o khode vosstaniia v Turgaiskoi oblasti i o boiakh karatel’nogo otriada polkovnika Rozena s krupnymi otriadami povstantsev” ibid., 615. At the same time, the Turgai rebels also exhibited strategic thinking in combat; the reports note that the rebels often chose to carry out their attacks under the cover of darkness taking advantage of their familiarity with the terrain. i “Telegramma nachal’nika shtaba Kazanskogo voennogo okruga N. F. Dobrushina nachal’niku General’nogo shtaba P. I. Aver’ianovu o formirovanii novykh voinskikh chastei dlia peredachi ikh ekspeditsionnomu karatel’nomu otriadu general-leitenanta Lavrent’eva v sviazi s uspekhami vosstavshikh” in ibid., 606. Furthermore, the rebels employed a network of scouts to gather intelligence on the movements of the punitive forces. i Iz zhurnala voennykh deistvii Turgaiskogo otriada karatel’noi ekspeditsii general-leitenanta Lavrent’eva” in ibid., 602. During periods of rest, they established outposts and deployed mounted patrols, ensuring surveillance within a radius of 25 versts from their forces. i “Telegramma komanduiuschego voiskami Kazanskogo voennogo okruga A. G. Sandetskogo nachal’niku General’nogo shtaba P. I. Aver’ianovu o khode vosstaniia v Turgaiskoi oblasti i o boiakh karatel’nogo otriada s vosstavshimi” in ibid., 610. In short, as stated in one of the reports, “the rebels’ actions had the nature of a partisan war”. i “Telegramma nachal’nika shtaba Kazanskogo voennogo okruga N. F. Dobrushina nachal’niku General’nogo shtaba P. I. Aver’ianovu o formirovanii novykh voinskikh chastei dlia peredachi ikh ekspeditsionnomu karatel’nomu otriadu general-leitenanta Lavrent’eva v sviazi s uspekhami vosstavshikh” in ibid., 606.

On October 22, the rebellious Kazakhs began the siege of the town of Turgai that lasted until the end of November. In the early hours of November 6, the rebel army launched a fierce assault on the town. According to eyewitness accounts, 12,000 mounted fighters charged on the town in four columns. Although failing to capture the town, the rebels inflicted significant damage by destroying approximately 100 houses on the outskirts of Turgai and setting fire to the surrounding hayfields, reeds, and bulrushes. i “Telegramma komanduiuschego voiskami Kazanskogo voennogo okruga A. G. Sandetskogo nachal’niku glavnogo shtaba M. I. Zankevichu o deistviiakh kazakhskikh povstancheskikh otriadov v Turgaiskoi oblasti” in ibid., 617. The advancing punitive expedition led by general Lavrent’ev forced the rebel army to retreat, but was ultimately unable to defeat it.

In the following months, the punitive forces, which now included 17 infantry companies, 19 Cossack companies and squadrons, 14 field-guns, and 17 machine guns, continued to engage the rebels in the steppe with varying degrees of success i “Iz doneseniia komanduiuschego voiskami Kazanskogo voennogo okruga A. G. Sandetskogo v Glavnoe upravlenie General’nogo shtaba o chislennosti karatel’nykh otriadov i o khode vosstaniia v Turgaiskoi oblasti” in ibid., 608. . On November 30, one of the punitive expeditions unleashed a barrage of artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire against the rebel forces. Days later, on December 3, another punitive expedition reported killing 3,000 rebels i A.V. Ganin, "Posledniaia Poludennaia Ekspeditsiia Imperarorskoi Rossii: Russkaia Armiia Na Podavlenii Turkestanskogo Miatezha, 1916–1917 Gg.," in Russkii Sbornik: Issledovaniia Po Istorii Rossii Xix–Xx Vv., ed. O.R. Airapetov et al. (Moscow: Modest Kolerov, 2008), 198. . Despite their best efforts, however, the punitive forces failed to deal a mortal blow to the rebel army. While the Argyn rebels eventually surrendered, the Qypshaqs persisted in their fight. On the eve of the February Revolution, Abdulgafar Janbosynov had reportedly sent his brother Sadiman to Bukhara to purchase weapons i “Telegramma komanduiuschego voiskami Kazanskogo voennogo okruga L. G. Sandetskogo nachal’niku General’nogo shtaba P. I. Aver’ianovu o raspolozhenii otriadov vosstavshikh, rukovodimykh Amandel’dy Imanovym, i o volneniiakh na kopiakh Atbasarskogo aktsionernogo obschestva” in Piaskovskii, Vosstanie 1916 Goda V Srednei Azii I Kazakhstane: Sbornik Dokumentov, 624. . The news of the February Revolution ultimately persuaded the Qypshaq rebels to lay down their arms. The uprising in Turgai, therefore, was never fully suppressed; instead, it gradually faded out following the fall of the Tsarist government.

In contrast, the uprising in Semirech'e was ruthlessly suppressed by October. The punitive forces dispatched to the region were significantly larger compared to those in Turgai, consisting of 35 companies, 24 Cossack cavalry squadrons, 240 mounted scouts, and various settler militias. They were equipped with 16 field-guns and 47 machine guns i Usenbaev, 1916: Geroicheskie I Tragicheskie Stranitsy, 41. . The sizable presence of the Semirech'e punitive expedition likely reflected the scale of attacks on settler villages, predominantly concentrated in the Przhevalsk uezd (the modern-day Issyk-Kul oblast of Kyrgyzstan). Despite the relatively smaller scale of disturbances in the Verny, Zharkent, and Lepsinsk uezds, the punitive forces carried out indiscriminate killings of the native population.

How many Kazakhs were killed by the punitive expeditions in Semirech’e and Turgai is difficult to determine due to the lack of official records. The Kyrgyz historian Dzhenish Dzhunushaliev estimates that approximately 16,000 Semirech’e nomads lost their lives during the clashes with punitive forces throughout the course of the uprising and the subsequent mass migration to China i D. D. Dzhunushaliev, "V Epitsentre Vosstaniia," Vestnik KRSU 15, no. 9 (2015): 206. . A member of the punitive expedition to Turgai boasted that his forces killed more than 6,000 Kazakhs, including women and children i Ganin, "Posledniaia Poludennaia Ekspeditsiia Imperarorskoi Rossii: Russkaia Armiia Na Podavlenii Turkestanskogo Miatezha, 1916–1917 Gg.," 202-03. . Many more perished due to famine, exposure, and diseases. Adding to the misery, the authorities seized 50 percent of the native population’s horses, 55 percent of their camels, 39 percent of their cattle, and 58 percent of their sheep and goats i Smele, "The "Russian" Civil Wars, 1916-1926: Ten Years That Shook the World," 20. .

We can say with certainty that thousands of nomads lost their lives at the hands of soldiers and Cossacks, while an even larger number perished while attempting to flee. In Semirech’e, the flight of Kazakhs to China in search of safety resulted in immense suffering and hardship.

The demographic statistics reveal a significant decline in the native population of the three Kazakh uezds in the Semirech'e oblast. By January 1917, the Kazakh population in the Verny and Lepsinsk uezds had nearly halved. The Verny uezd experienced a loss of 1,932 households out of a total of 4,347, while the Lepsinsk uezd recorded a loss of 3,442 households out of 7,071. However, it was the Zharkent uezd that suffered the most substantial population loss, with 12,718 households out of 17,096 fleeing the uezd. i Asfendiiarov, Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'noe Vosstanie 1916 Goda V Kazakhstane, 104.

In total, anywhere between 164,000 and 250,000 Kazakhs and Kyrgyz sought refuge in Eastern Turkestan. iKoigeldiev, Zhetisu - Ystykkol Kasireti. Kuzhattar Men Materialdar Zhinagy. 1916-1920 Zhzh., 5. Smele, "The "Russian" Civil Wars, 1916-1926: Ten Years That Shook the World." Despite their escape, refugees’ hardships were far from over. Many had lost their livestock during their flight. Still more fell victim to the plunder by the punitive forces, which stripped the fleeing nomads of any valuables in addition to driving off their animals. According to native estimates, the fleeing nomads lost three-quarters of their property to the plunder by the punitive forces and gangs of armed settlers. i “Zaiavlenie v Prezidium TurTsIKA ot Semirechenskikh delegatov, 27 ianvaria 1920 goda” in M. K. Koigeldiev, ed. Kazak Ult-Azattyk Kozgalysy (Almaty: Otkrytaia biblioteka Kazakhstana, 2011), 190. Soon, hunger and diseases ravaged those who survived the flight. Tynyshpaev estimated that more than half, or 83,000 refugees out of 164,000, perished in China. i Koigeldiev, Zhetisu - Ystykkol Kasireti. Kuzhattar Men Materialdar Zhinagy. 1916-1920 Zhzh., 5. To survive, many families resorted to selling their children and young women. As many as 4,000 women and children from Semirech’e were sold in Eastern Turkestan. i “Zaiavlenie v Prezidium TurTsIKA ot Semirechenskikh delegatov, 27 ianvaria 1920 goda” in Koigeldiev, Kazak Ult-Azattyk Kozgalysy, 191. Native representatives described the refugees as “uncovered and shoeless” and “without livestock”. i “Zaiavlenie v Prezidium TurTsIKA ot Semirechenskikh delegatov, 27 ianvaria 1920 goda” in ibid., 190.

The fate of those who remained in Semirech’e was equally dire. Despite the promises of national equality, the February Revolution did not bring any relief to the afflicted communities. A petition submitted by the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs of the Pishpek uezd to the Provisional Government painted a bleak picture of the relationship between the colonists and the indigenous population: “the Russian peasants…threaten to kill the Kyrgyz. There is no rule in the uezd and no one to protect us”. i TsGVIA RF f. 400, Aziatskaia chast’, d. 42, l. 84-85 in David Budianskii, Istoriia Bezhentsev-Kyrgyzov (1916-1927 Gody) (Bishkek2006), 81. A report by Muslim deputies of the Provisional Government corroborates the native account: “the Kirghiz are being hunted down” and suffer from famine. i “Telegramma musul’manskogo soveta Turkestanskogo kraia Vremennomu pravitel’stvu i ispol’notel’nomu komitetu soveta soldatskikh deputatov o bedstvennom polozhenii “kirgiz,” 30 iiunia 1917 g.”, RGVIA f. 400, op. 1, d. 4639, l. 110

The anguish experienced by the native society in the wake of the uprising finds expression in folk songs, poems, and family histories. Among these, the song “Samaltau,” composed at the time of the uprising and recently performed by Dimash Qudaibergen, among many others, stands out as a prominent example. Through the voice of a conscripted young man, the song portrays the soldier’s apprehensions about his own future and the well-being of his elderly parents. It also serves as a poignant lament for the tragic fate of the “wretched people” (qairan el) who were beset by hardships and sorrow. Another notable example of popular reflections on the events of 1916 is the poem “Tar Zaman” (Time of Troubles) written by the renowned aqyn Sartbai. In the poem, he pours scorn on the Tsar for ruining and inflicting violence on Kazakhs. Similarly critical of the Russian emperor is poet Isa Baizakov, who compares Nicholas II to a leech sucking the blood of the Kazakh people. “My innocent homeland, what have they done to you?” he laments before sorrowfully responding that they (the Tsarist forces) “made your daughter into wife, your shanyraq into firewood” and “washed the country with blood.”

Despite the brutal suppression of the uprising, it would be a mistake to think that the imperial government benefitted from the destruction it inflicted upon the native communities. The actions of the punitive forces further alienated the native population of the region and created a sense of siege among the settler society. The suppression of the uprising also diverted the vital resources from the front, weakening the war effort, and made the central government a target of pointed critique in the State Duma. Furthermore, the draft proved largely unsuccessful. Out of the intended 480,000 workers to be mobilized from Turkestan, only a quarter, or 123,205 men, were actually recruited. i P. A. Kovalev, Tylovye Rabochie Turkestana V Gody Pervoi Mirovoi Voiny: (1916 - Mai 1917 Gg.) (Tashkent: Gosizdat Uzbekskoi SSR, 1957), 82. Similarly, the Turgai oblast fell significantly short of the projected total, providing only 10,175 workers out of the planned 36,000 men. i Ganin, "Posledniaia Poludennaia Ekspeditsiia Imperarorskoi Rossii: Russkaia Armiia Na Podavlenii Turkestanskogo Miatezha, 1916–1917 Gg.," 204.

More importantly, the uprising shaped in profound ways the dynamics of the civil war pitting the native and settler societies. From the perspective of the native nomads, the civil war was seen as an extension of the conflict that began in 1916. The settler society also viewed the civil war through the lens of competition for native land and resources. The arming of colonists in the aftermath of the uprising enabled settler communities to assert their dominance over the native population and navigate the civil war with minimal losses. It is a little surprise then that Akhmet Baitursynov described the civil war in the Steppe as marked by “violence, looting, abuses, and a peculiar dictatorial power”. i Akhmet Baitursynov, "Revoliutsiia I Kirgizy," Zhizn' natsional'nostei, no. 25 (37) (1919): 1.

On the other hand, the uprising and the subsequent civil war had a mobilizing effect on the native society, allowing the native intelligentsia to establish strong ties with the native communities they sought to represent. In the aftermath of the uprising, numerous members of the Alash served as translators and intermediaries between the drafted men and the authorities. They negotiated and petitioned the government in Petrograd on behalf of the Muslim labourers from the region. In the words of the Japanese historian of Alash, Tomohiko Uyama, these efforts made them both “larger and more popular” with the native laborers. Equally significant, the Alash leaders recognized the land issue as a crucial factor behind the uprising and made it a central component of their political agenda. The political programme of the party focused on demanding an end to the colonization of the Steppe and Turkestan, as well as equal land rights and political representation for the nomads. In the course of the civil war and the bloody struggle for control in the Steppe, these demands transformed into calls for national autonomy for the native population. Ultimately, as one scholar put it, “the Revolt of 1916 was both the prelude to the Revolution in Russia proper and the catalytic agent which hastened the alignment of forces in Russian Central Asia.”