The kazakh khanate: Between two empires

Although the Kazakhs of the Middle Jüz formally recognized Qing authority in 1756, diplomacy always took precedence in the empire’s relations with the Kazakh khanates. In practice, these were interstate relations, and for the Qing, establishing diplomatic ties with the Kazakhs was primarily a means of securing its western border.

It is noteworthy that the Qing Empire’s harsh policies toward the Dzungars were partly due to the fact that the latter sought to establish themselves as a nomadic state in Mongolia, posing a threat to China’s borders. The Dzungars were a consolidated force with a more centralized government and kinship ties to Mongolian tribes, and they also pursued an expansionist policy toward Tibet.

For the Qing, the Dzungars posed a real threat, and the years of war only highlighted how dangerous this rival was. Ultimately, the empire chose a radical, brutal solution to the existence of the Dzungar Khanate: complete destruction. However, when it came to the Kazakh steppe, their calculations were different. Expanding farther west into the steppe held no strategic benefit, and a campaign to control such vast territories would have required enormous resources and costs, making diplomacy a far more effective tool.

The Kazakhs, however, did not represent as significant a threat to the Qing Empire as the Dzungars. Thus, it was more beneficial to establish diplomatic relations with them at various levels, including a rather formal acknowledgment of dependence and the promotion of trade and economic ties. To facilitate this, the Qing granted Kazakh merchants access to the trade markets of eastern Turkestan, a region that would later be known as Xinjiang.

As a result, a complex system of interactions developed between the Kazakh khanates and the Qing Empire along the eastern border. For example, in 1759, the most influential sultan of the Middle Jüz, Ablai, traveled to Beijing on a diplomatic mission and formally pledged allegiance to the Qing Empire, receiving the title of ‘Wang’ in return. This title signified dependence among steppe rulers, but only in a nominal sense. Historically, during the struggle for the Mongol Empire, the title ‘Wang’ was held by the powerful yet highly independent Kereit khan Toghrul, who became known as Wang Khan. In 1762, Ablai even sent his son as an amanat (hostage) to the Qing Empire. Thus, under these circumstances, Kazakh merchants gained access to trade markets in Kashgar and Chuguchak in the province of Xinjiang.

While still a sultan of the Middle Jüz, Ablai, along with Khan Abulmambet, also worked to establish diplomatic relations with the Russian Empire, and formally, this was also considered a form of dependence. In reality, however, these agreements held little actual significance and allowed the Kazakh rulers to secure military and trade benefits while maintaining a degree of autonomy in the vast steppe—just like the cases of the khans Abul Khair and Samake, which we discussed in the previous parts of this course. For the Kazakh khans, this was a way to maintain a diplomatic balance between the Russian and Qing empires. These diplomatic relationships brought a measure of stability to the Kazakh khanates, especially in key areas where their interests overlapped with these powerful empires.

The Kazakh khans skillfully maneuvered between the interests of the Russian and Qing empires, avoiding actual subjugation. Their success was partly due to the fact that neither empire’s primary interests were directly tied to the territories of the Kazakh khanates. The Qing Empire maintained only a nominal military presence, with its main concerns focused on the agrarian regions of China. Meanwhile, all through the eighteenth century, Russian imperial policy was primarily directed toward the steppes of the Black Sea region and the north Caucasus. As historian Anatoly Remnev noted:

This created a window of opportunity of a sort for the Kazakh khanates. Despite their formal dependence on two empires, they managed to effectively maintain their independence. It is also worth noting that the Russian Empire managed its relations with the Kazakh khans through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the same time, the Kazakh khanates pursued an active foreign policy in other strategic directions. In particular, Khan Abul Khair of the Junior Jüz and his successor, Khan Nuraly, played a significant role in the internal politics of the Khivan Khanate. In November 1740, Abul Khair was even proclaimed khan of Khiva. Before him, the Kazakh Chinggisid Ilbars had held the throne but was killed during an assault on Khiva by the ruler of Iran, Nadir Shah. However, Abul Khair remained in power for only a few days before the Iranians installed Tagir as the new Khivan khan. By the end of 1740, Tagir was assassinated by Nuraly, who then briefly ruled Khiva himself.

The general political influence exerted by the Kazakh khans along the southern borders of Central Asia played a key role in these relations. This influence was determined by military capabilities and the lineage of the Kazakh elite. Before the rise of strong local Uzbek tribal elites in the second half of the eighteenth century—specifically, the Mings in Kokand, the Kungrats in Khiva, and the Manghits in Bukhara—Kazakh Chinggisids were highly sought after as rulers in various Central Asian states.

Additionally, the Kazakhs continued to control the cities along the Syr Darya and the trade markets connecting them to the settled regions of Central Asia. In particular, the influential Ablai Khan moved the seat of the Kazakh khans to the city of Turkestan, the former capital of the Kazakh Khanate.

Ablai became Khan of the Middle Jüz in 1771 after the death of Abulmambet, and during his election, the idea of a pan-Kazakh khan was already being discussed. Representatives of all three jüzes participated in the process, and given Ablai’s authority and his control over the Syr Darya cities, this was seen as an attempt to centralize power within the new historical context.

It is important to note that in the conditions of the late eighteenth century, Turkestan held a uniquely strategic position. Unlike the border regions of the Kazakh steppe, which were directly influenced by both the Russian and Qing empires, its location put Turkestan beyond their reach and allowed it some autonomy. At that time, Russia had not yet developed the capability to penetrate so deep into the steppes. The nineteenth-century Russian historian Alexey Levshin offered some insights on Khan Ablai:

The nineteenth-century Russian historian Alexey Levshin offered some insights on Khan Ablai:

It is also noteworthy that when Empress Catherine II recognized Ablai as the khan of the Middle Jüz in 1778, he did not travel to the Russian border to receive the official documents. Since he aspired to be an all-Kazakh khan, Russia’s recognition of him only as the ruler of the Middle Jüz did not align with his interests. Moreover, he controlled the key trade markets along the southern borders of Central Asia and had no use for Russian trade cities. This was undoubtedly significant for Kazakh tribes along the border near Russian fortresses.

Ablai clearly sought greater independence for the Kazakh Khanate. Still, even a formal dependence on Russia and the Qing Empire imposed certain limitations on him as ‘the core of his policy remained maneuvering between the interests of Russia and China’. His refusal to accept Russian documents reflected these political priorities.

At the same time, his actions demonstrated that Russia lacked real leverage over Kazakh khans in the southern regions, notably when they, like Ablai, refused to engage. One of the reasons Saint Petersburg could not recognize Ablai as an all-Kazakh khan was its prior recognition of Nuraly as the khan of the Junior Jüz. However, a more significant reason lay in the policy expressed in a letter from the Collegium of Foreign Affairs to Catherine II:

At the same time, Russia’s policy toward the Junior Jüz was a crucial element of its broader border strategy concerning the Kazakhs. The Russian Empire undoubtedly had more significant interests in this region than in the more remote areas of the Kazakh steppe along the southern borders of Central Asia. This was especially true due to the heightened political activity within the Junior Jüz, involving Chinggisid families and various Kazakh tribes.

The Junior Kazakh Jüz held a strategically advantageous position between the Russian Empire’s borders and the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, where Kazakh households maintained their winter pastures. Essentially, this provided the Junior Jüz with strategic depth in its relations with the Russian Empire as, during this historical period, they could always retreat southward from the Russian border if necessary.

It is important to note that until the early nineteenth century, Russia lacked the military capability to launch deep incursions into the Kazakh steppe. As a result, they could not exert direct military pressure on Kazakh tribes and individual Chinggisids in the event of conflicts. Thus, in the eighteenth century, Russian authorities had no choice but to maintain diplomatic relations with the Kazakhs.

Simultaneously, they could exploit internal divisions among the Kazakhs to strengthen their influence. For instance, in 1742, Khan Abul Khair sent a letter to Orenburg governor Neplyuev, informing him that the Dzungar ruler Galdan Tseren had offered him vassalage. In the same letter, he proposed that, under the guise of taking hostages, Khan Abulmambet and sultans Barak and Batyr could be prevented from aligning with the Dzungars. Tensions among Kazakh khans and sultans escalated after the fall of the Dzungar Khanate and the disappearance of an external threat. In particular, the conflict between Khan Abul Khair and sultans Barak and Batyr, which culminated in Abul Khair’s assassination by Sultan Barak in 1748.

The circumstances of this event clearly illustrate the crisis of power in the Kazakh khanates, particularly in the Junior Jüz. In early 1748, Khivan khan Kaip, the son of Sultan Batyr, sent a wedding caravan to Sultan Barak as part of an arranged marriage for his daughter. Khan Abul Khair’s forces, however, attacked the caravan, and in response, Sultan Barak launched an attack on the Qaraqalpaqs, who recognized Abul Khair’s authority. As events unfolded, Abul Khair was ultimately killed by Barak.

Following this, the Junior Jüz found itself being ruled by two khans. Abul Khair’s son Nuraly inherited his father’s power, while Batyr was elected khan in the southern regions bordering the Central Asian states, where he was supported by his son Kaip. Meanwhile, Sultan Barak also assumed the title of khan in Ikan, near Turkestan.

The conflict between khans Nuraly and Batyr, along with the de facto formation of two khanates, had a negative impact on the overall situation of the Kazakh tribes. Given that the winter pastures of the Junior Jüz tribes were located in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, this political confrontation was at odds with their economic interests. Further, the conflict also affected trade between the Russian Empire and Central Asia, which had been growing in importance since the mid-nineteenth century.

Despite the political tensions, no major upheavals resulted from this conflict. This was essentially a sign of the gradual weakening of the khanate’s authority. Tribal structures increasingly came to the forefront, and in the absence of an external threat, the significance of the khan’s power began to decline. At the same time, it remained influential, albeit in a more decentralized form. Despite formal acts of dependence and constant maneuvering between the interests of two empires, the Kazakh khans retained actual autonomy. A clear example of this was the policy of Nuraly Khan of the Junior Jüz, who, despite being officially recognized by Russian authorities, pursued an aggressive strategy against the Kalmyk Khanate in the west and the Turkmens in Mangyshlak.

From the 1750s onward, the Junior Jüz actively waged war against the Kalmyk Khanate, even though both khanates were formally under Russian rule. This conflict directly affected Russian interests. While the degree of dependence on Russia varied, as did the level of involvement in its affairs, the hostilities between the Kazakhs and Kalmyks demonstrated the real limits of Russian influence in steppe politics. This was particularly significant given that the Kalmyk Khanate served as an important cavalry force for Russia’s wars against the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire in the Black Sea steppes and the North Caucasus, as well as in the Seven Years’ War against Prussia.

For the Junior Jüz, the pastures between the Yaik (Ural) and Volga rivers were of great importance, but these lands were occupied by the Kalmyks. In the 1620s, the Kalmyks had driven out the Nogais, partially incorporating them into their khanate, and by the mid-eighteenth century, they had controlled these lands for over 120 years. During this time, many eastern Nogais aligned themselves with the Kazakhs. After the fall of the Dzungar Khanate, the war against the Kalmyks for pasturelands became a key priority in Kazakh foreign policy. Meanwhile, Russian authorities sought to restrict Kazakh movements beyond the Yaik.

In 1756, an imperial decree banned Kazakh migration across the river, and in 1757, Empress Elizabeth sent a separate letter to Nuraly Khan on the matter. Russia attempted to separate the Kazakhs and Kalmyks by establishing fortress lines along the Yaik River, but this did not prevent the Kazakhs from crossing beyond these lines. The situation remained tense until 1771, when a major crisis occurred in relations between the Russian Empire and the Kalmyk Khanate, leading most of the Kalmyks to attempt a migration to Dzungaria. However, their attempt to break through the Kazakh steppes was disastrous, and only a small group managed to reach Dzungaria. As a result, after the Kalmyks’ departure, the steppes between the Yaik and Volga were finally left open.

In 1756, Khan Kaip, the son of Khan Batyr, was overthrown by Uzbek emirs and fled to his father. Meanwhile, another of Batyr’s sons, Baibori, the Qaraqalpaq khan, was also deposed by the Uzbeks and handed over to the Khivans, who executed him. This undermined Batyr’s family while bolstering Nuraly’s influence, as Nuraly actively engaged in the internal politics of the Khivan Khanate.

In 1769, Nuraly unsuccessfully joined the war on the side of the Khivan Uzbeks against the Turkmens. However, by 1770, his son Piraly had become the khan of the Turkmens in Mangyshlak, while another son, Bulekai, briefly ruled as the khan of Khiva before later becoming the khan of the Qaraqalpaqs. Nuraly’s active southern policy allowed him to take control of trade between the Russian Empire and Central Asia, providing him with additional revenue.

Ultimately, the defeat of the Kalmyks allowed the Kazakhs to expand into the Volga-Yaik interfluve. After 1770, when the Ersari Turkmens were forced to leave Mangyshlak after a prolonged armed conflict, Kazakhs from the Adai tribe settled there. Although the Kazakh khans had lost influence within the Khivan Khanate, they retained control over its approaches by maintaining authority over the Qaraqalpaqs.

The Kazakh khanates now had simultaneous access to the trade markets of China, Russia, and the states of southern Central Asia. Additionally, they profited from the transit trade between Russia and Central Asia, which became increasingly active in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, their dependence on the Qing and Russian Empires remained largely nominal.

The presence of multiple political centers among the Kazakhs complicated the centralization of power, a challenge that became particularly evident when Khan Ablai attempted to restore a unified Kazakh Khanate with its center in Turkestan. Yet the necessary conditions for such unification were lacking.

In the absence of an immediate external threat, the Kazakh khanates, Chinggisid families, and individual tribes had little interest in political unification. Instead, they preferred to establish independent relations with neighboring states. However, by the early nineteenth century, it would become clear that this strategy was not particularly effective in protecting their interests.