Kazakh Khanate: The Dzungar Question

Undoubtedly, the Dzungar Khanate was the most serious threat to the Kazakh state, especially because the Kalmyk Khanate, closely related to the Dzungars, lay to the west. In effect, the Kazakhs were caught between Oirat tribes on both their eastern and western fronts. Nonetheless, the Kazakh Khanate managed to resist Dzungar expansion throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This resistance became even more crucial after the conquest of East Turkestan, gaining control of Kashgar, a strategic pathway into Central Asia.

Despite these challenges, the Kazakh Khanate remained relatively stable, thanks primarily to the continued existence of a mostly effective central authority compared to the preceding period. From 1680 to 1718, Tauke Khan ruled with skill and diplomacy, maintaining unity by carefully balancing power between the tribal biysiBiy (in Kazakh, Би, Bi) were elected judges and administrators in the Kazakh Khanate and held a rank below sultans. Unlike the hereditary title bey, the position of biy was not passed down through family lines. and the influential Chingissids. The struggle between these two groups largely shaped the internal politics of the Kazakh Khanate in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and Tauke Khan’s introduction of the Zheti ZhargyiThe Zheti Zhargy (in Kazakh, Жеті Жарғы; in English, Seven Charters) was a legal code introduced in the Kazakh Khanate by Tauke Khan. It enforced strict justice, including the death penalty for rebellion, treason, murder, adultery, and theft. Other laws mandated compensation for injuries and severe penalties for horse theft. legal code was an attempt to institutionalize authority.

In addition, the Kazakh Khanate maintained firm control over the cities along the Syr Darya, including Tashkent. These provided the state with tax revenues from the sedentary population and access to vital trade markets, essential for the nomadic economy. Notably, during Tauke Khan’s rule, there were fewer independent khans in this region as compared to the reign of his grandfather Yesim. Tauke Khan represented central authority in the key settled cities and oases.

Another key factor in the Kazakh Khanate’s stability was that its main eastern adversary, the Dzungar Khanate, was preoccupied with war in Mongolia. The Dzungars sought to establish control over all Mongol tribes and rally them against the Qing Empire. Their primary interests lay in the east, where the agrarian resources of Qing China were crucial to sustaining their nomadic state centered in Mongolia—they relied on both trade and the receipt of tributes and gifts to support their economy and military campaigns.

However, in 1721, after a failed war with the Qing Empire, the Dzungars permanently lost control of Mongolia. Following this, the Dzungar Khanate was able to redirect its military focus toward the Kazakh Khanate and other regions of Central Asia. The Dzungars needed control over the region’s trade centers and sedentary populations for taxation while also expanding into the Kazakh steppe for new pastures. In many ways, their defeat in the east made their westward expansion inevitable.

In 1723, the Dzungar army launched an attack on the Kazakh Khanate, and they held several military advantages in this war. Strict laws in Dzungaria mandated that the population participate in military campaigns, and a well-organized system for large-scale military formations was already in place. Additionally, the Dzungar forces, equipped with firearms and hardened by years of warfare against the Qing Empire, were a formidable military power.

At the same time, the Kazakh Khanate faced yet another growing crisis of leadership following the death of Tauke Khan. His successor, Kaip Khan, ruled briefly from 1716 to 1718, but his position was never as strong or unifying as Tauke’s. His relationship with the late khan had been somewhat uncertain, and when Kaip died in 1718, the situation only worsened, and no single figure emerged as the supreme Kazakh khan. Formally, the title belonged to Bolat, Tauke’s son, but in Tashkent, Zholbarys was also recognized as khan. Additionally, each of the three jüzes had its own khan: Abulkhair in the Junior Jüz, Sameke in the Middle Jüz, and Bolat in the Senior Jüz.

Although the Kazakh tribal forces were significant in number, they often engaged the disciplined Dzungar army separately, leading to repeated defeats. The previous decentralization of power undoubtedly played a role in this.

These defeats had catastrophic consequences such as the loss of vast territories, including central regions of the Kazakh Khanate. Moreover, some Kazakh tribes recognized Dzungar authority, such as Khan Zholbarys, the ruler of Tashkent. Soon, the Dzungars occupied key cities along the Syr Darya but left local rulers in power.

Amidst this severe political crisis and other military failures, attempts were made to consolidate forces during a kurultaiiA kurultai was a traditional assembly of Turkic and Mongolic leaders, convened to make key political, military, and strategic decisions, such as electing rulers, declaring war, or forming alliances. It played a crucial role in uniting fragmented groups. involving all three jüzes in the Ordabasy region. One of the main reasons for this was the loss of the Syr Darya cities, which had been crucial markets for agricultural and craft goods. However, an even greater problem was the loss of pastures in central and southern Kazakhstan, which forced many Kazakh tribes to flee. The situation was further complicated by key migration routes to the west being blocked by the Kalmyk Khanate.

After the kurultai at Ordabasy, the Kazakh forces won several battles, the largest being the Anrakay Battle of 1729. The Dzungars retreated eastward, abandoning the Syr Darya cities, and this was also influenced by shifts in their relations with the Qing Empire and the Kalmyk Khanate.

In 1727, Galdan Tseren came to power in Dzungaria. His conflict with Ayuka weakened the ties between the Oirat states, improving the Kazakhs’ position. From 1729 onward, Dzungaria entered a new war with the Qing, diverting its forces to the east and weakening its stance in the west.

The war between the Dzungars and the Qing Empire lasted until 1739. Despite this, however, clashes between the Dzungars and the Kazakhs continued in the steppes of eastern Kazakhstan from the Anrakay Battle to the end of the Qing–Dzungar war. The Kazakh tribes sought to reclaim lost pastures, while the Dzungars periodically launched offensives, though their primary military efforts were focused eastward toward Qing-controlled Mongolia.

At the same time, the process of decentralization within the Kazakh Khanate intensified. The Dzungars’ expulsion from the Syr Darya cities did not lead to the restoration of a strong central Kazakh authority. Instead, as the Dzungar threat diminished, conflicts of interest among the Kazakh khans escalated. One manifestation of this struggle was the shift in political activity of Abul Khair, khan of the Junior Jüz, and Sameke, khan of the Middle Jüz, toward the north, closer to the Russian border.

This shift was driven by the prolonged and devastating war with the Dzungars and the broader political crisis in Central Asia, which diminished the region's economic significance. Many areas had been ravaged by military campaigns, disrupting the economic exchange between settled populations and nomadic tribes.

Meanwhile, in the early 1730s, the Russian Empire launched what was known as the Orenburg expedition, establishing the Orenburg line of fortresses, which separated the Bashkirs from the Kazakhs. As a result, the Bashkirs were fully incorporated into the Russian Empire and lost their independence. One consequence of this expansion was the emergence of new trading centers along the Kazakh Khanate’s northern border. Before this, the Kazakhs had no access to the trading centers on the Volga, as the Kalmyks controlled the area, while trading centers on the Irtysh, such as the Semipalatinsk fortress, were inaccessible due to the ongoing war with the Dzungars.

With the founding of Orenburg and its network of fortresses, direct contact between Kazakh khans and the Russian Empire was established. This period also saw the khans Abul Khair and Sameke formally accepting Russian suzerainty, a move that Soviet historiography later interpreted as the annexation of the Kazakh Khanate by Russia. In reality, however, agrarian empires like Russia and Qing China typically collected documents of allegiance from nomadic peoples, but this would not result in actual control over the steppe until they could establish their own strategic outposts within the region.

For nomadic states, such documents were largely symbolic and did not imply any real dependence. In Abul Khair Khan’s case, it is known that he swore allegiance three times, but he often renounced these commitments, citing Russian violations of the agreements. Notably, Abul Khair demanded that Russia build a city on the border that would serve as his power base within the steppe, just like Tashkent and Turkestan functioned on the frontier with the settled regions of Central Asia. While Russia did construct the city, it was explicitly ordered that it not be handed over to Abul Khair.

Kazakh khans such as Abul Khair, Sameke, Abilmambet, and Ablai viewed agreements with the Russian Empire as a means of gaining access to Russian resources, particularly trade markets. Over the course of the eighteenth century, trade through Russian fortress markets became increasingly important to the Kazakh tribes. Moreover, the Kazakh khans sought support through the traditional nomadic system of relations with agrarian empires, relying on economic benefits from Russia’s transit trade with Central Asia as a crucial source of revenue.

However, in 1739, the Dzungar Khanate and the Qing Empire signed a peace treaty establishing their borders along the Altai Mountains. This marked the definitive loss of Dzungar political influence in Mongolia, and any access to Chinese resources—whether through trade or political ties—became impossible. As a result, the Dzungars were compelled to shift their strategic focus westward.

In 1741, Galdan Tseren launched a new campaign against the Kazakh Khanate and southern Central Asia. By this time, the Kazakh Khanate had been severely weakened by decentralization. Additionally, certain khans, such as Abul Khair and Sameke, had shifted much of their political activity northward toward the Russian border since the early 1730s. In 1740, Khan Zholbarys was assassinated in Tashkent by members of a local Sufi tariqa, further destabilizing the region.

The Kazakh tribes resisted the Dzungar advance individually, but their capabilities on the front lines were significantly inferior to the Dzungar Khanate’s well-organized army. Unlike in the 1720s, no attempts were made to hold a kurultai to coordinate efforts, as had been done in 1726. Notably, one of the prominent leaders of the time, Khan Abul Khair, was preoccupied with the affairs of the Khivan Khanate during the Dzungar offensive. As a result, the Senior Jüz recognized Dzungar authority and agreed to pay tribute in the form of one steppe fox (corsac) pelt per yurt.

It is important to note that this tribute was largely symbolic. In the steppe, since the time of Genghis Khan's Yassa, a tax of one livestock head per 100 people was more customary. However, for the Dzungars, reducing Kazakh resistance was of critical importance, especially in the strategically vital southern direction—through southern Kazakhstan toward Central Asia. Their main priority was securing access to Central Asia’s trade centers and agricultural regions to compensate for the loss of markets in the east. Additionally, Fergana and Samarkand also recognized their authority here.

The rise of the Dzungars and their control over Central Asian markets seriously threatened the remaining independent part of the Kazakh Khanate. Galdan Tseren demanded that the Kazakhs of the Middle and Junior Jüzes recognize his authority as well. However, the Dzungars faced challenges from the Russian Empire. For Russia, the issue was not merely that the Kazakhs were formally considered its subjects at the time. In reality, Russian authorities lacked the ability even to collect yasak (tribute), which was the main criterion of dependence, from the Kazakh population. Moreover, there were very few troops across Russia’s vast border with the Eurasian steppes, all the way from the Lower Volga to Mongolia. Most of them were either irregular Cossack forces or local nomadic tribes acting as ‘federates’.

In this situation, the strengthening of the Dzungar Khanate meant that Russia would have to worry about its border with them. If the Kazakhs of the Middle and Junior Jüzes had recognized Dzungar rule on the same terms as the Senior Jüz, it would have also increased the Dzungars' military capabilities. In steppe statehood, it was common to mobilize dependent nomadic tribes for military campaigns. The Kalmyks, for example, used the Nogais under their control, while the Dzungars relied on the Siberian Kyrgyz and some Mongol groups.

Since Russia lacked the ability to deploy regular troops to the steppe border, it would have struggled to resist the mobile and well-organized Dzungar army, which possessed firearms and artillery. It was clear that border Cossacks and federate nomadic forces would not have been able to withstand the Dzungars, who could strike anywhere along the vast frontier.

Therefore, the Russian Empire undertook diplomatic efforts to prevent the Dzungar Khanate from expanding toward the Kazakhs. At the same time, it also considered the Kalmyks, who were related to the Dzungars and had become a formidable force in the Russian army during the 1740s. The Russian diplomatic mission to the Dzungars proved relatively successful, largely because the Dzungar Khanate was not inclined to engage in war with yet another agrarian empire after a series of defeats by the Qing Empire. Instead, it also sought a negotiated resolution.

However, the situation changed in 1742 with the rise of the Ming Uzbek tribe in Central Asia, which began pushing the Dzungars out of the region. Notably, this tribe later formed the ruling dynasty of the Kokand Khanate. In 1745, after Galdan Tseren's death, a power struggle erupted within the Dzungar Khanate. This period of internal turmoil and coups gradually eroded Dzungar political influence in the region.

In 1749, Tséwang Dörji, khan of the Dzungar Khanate, was overthrown, and Lama Dörji took power. However, in 1751, an uprising against him was led by Amursana and Dabachi. After being defeated, they fled to the Kazakhs, returning in 1753 and overthrowing Lama Dörji with Kazakh support.

What mattered most was that the Kazakhs had begun influencing Dzungar internal politics. This created the right conditions to gradually push the Dzungars eastward, reclaiming previously occupied Kazakh pastures.

Sultan Ablai emerged as a pivotal leader of his time, taking a decisive, active stand in the struggle against the Dzungars. In 1754, Amursana led a rebellion against Dabachi, but after his defeat, he fled to the Qing Empire, which later helped him return. However, rather than handing power over to him, the Qing dynasty eliminated the Dzungar Khanate entirely. In 1755, when Amursana rebelled against the Qing Empire, Ablai granted him refuge and, in 1756, even joined him in fighting against the Qing. However, they were defeated, prompting Ablai to shift tactics and establish diplomatic relations with the Qing Empire.

This moment marked a turning point for the Kazakh Khanate, a transition from independent statehood with a clear political stance to a strategy of maneuvering between neighboring powers. After the destruction of the Dzungar Khanate and the mass death of its population during the suppression of Amursana’s rebellion, maintaining an independent foreign policy in the Central Eurasian steppe became increasingly difficult. Thus, the era of diplomacy had begun.

Notably, Ablai Khan was one of the last leaders to attempt to restore centralized power in the Kazakh Khanate. However, this proved extremely difficult. The once-unified Kazakh Khanate had become fragmented, with numerous local political entities—khans, sultans, and tribal leaders—each pursuing their own interests. Many established diplomatic relations with neighboring states based primarily on local interests.

Nevertheless, elements of statehood and real autonomy still remained. For this reason, this era can be regarded as the period of the Kazakh khanates.