The Kazakh Khanate: Formation

The loss of these cities resulted in a decline in tax revenues from urban and agricultural populations, causing economic weaknesses in the Kazakh Khanate. For a nomadic society, maintaining trade points on the borders with agrarian states was crucial as they relied on being able to trade for agricultural and artisanal goods. In contrast, agrarian states often leveraged access to their markets as a powerful political tool against nomadic states. During the Kazakh Khanate’s prolonged war with the Uzbek Shaybanids, access to their markets became difficult and restricted for the Kazakhs.

Another key player in the turbulent political events of the early sixteenth century was Moghulistan. The Moghuls actively participated in the struggle for Timurid heritage, but many were ultimately forced to leave Central Asia, following Babur to Afghanistan and later to India. Additionally, the Moghuls permanently lost the Jetisu (Semirechye) region, which came under Kazakh control.

In 1514, after the establishment of the Uzbek Khanate, the Chagataid ruler Sultan Said Khan moved from southern Central Asia to the part of Moghulistan known as East Turkestan, which is now the modern-day Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. There, he defeated a local ruler from the Moghul Dughlat tribe, marking a new chapter in the history of the Moghul state.

At the same time, the Shaybanids managed to overcome the crisis that followed the death of Muhammad Shaybani in the Battle of Merv in 1510 against the Iranian Qizilbash. They repelled the joint offensive of the Qizilbash and the Timurid Babur. Without any real threats from the south, they could now concentrate their forces against the Kazakh Khanate.

The strengthening of the Shaybanids in Central Asia, along with the Kazakh Khanate’s relative failures in the struggle against them, placed the Kazakhs in a difficult position. With little hope of success in this war against the Shaybanids, the Kazakh Khanate redirected its military and political focus to the northwest.

Thus, in 1515, the Kazakh khan Qasym launched a campaign against the Nogai Horde, pushing the Nogais back to the Volga by 1519, and some Nogai groups crossed to the right bank of the river. Qasym made the city of Saray-Jük on the Jaiyq (Ural) River his headquarters. This city had previously also served as headquarters for his grandfather Barak Khan. Thus, the political center of the Kazakh Khanate shifted from the banks of the Syr Darya to the banks of the Zhaiyk. During this period, various Chinggisid rulers, including Qasym Khan, still viewed the struggle for the Lower Volga region as a contest to control a crucial political and economic hub of the former Ulus of Jochi.

Although the Lower Volga region no longer saw the same volume of trade as it did in the thirteenth–fourteenth centuries, it still served as a gateway to the agricultural and commercial regions of the Upper Volga, where the Kazan Khanate was located. It also provided access to the North Caucasus and the Black Sea coast, including the opportunity to establish relations with the Ottoman Empire. Most importantly, the Volga served as a trade route connecting northern Europe, via the Grand Duchy of Moscow, to Iran. Undoubtedly, the Lower Volga retained its strategic importance during this historical period.

Khan Qasym’s interest in the region was therefore entirely logical, especially since he could rely on the substantial military resources of the Kazakh Khanate, which, under his rule, controlled territory from the Volga to Jetisu. This positioned him as a significant player in regional politics. However, in the winter of 1520–21, Qasym died, triggering a power struggle within the Kazakh Khanate, during which his son, Khan Mamash, was also killed. Tahir, the son of Adik Sultan, then claimed the throne. Naturally, these events eroded the central authority of the Kazakh Khanate—the internal political turmoil led to a decline in military strength as a weakened khan lacked the ability to rally the military forces of the state's numerous tribes.

At the same time, in 1521, a conflict erupted between the Crimean Khanate and the Nogais. During the Crimean army’s campaign against Moscow, the Nogais and the forces of the Astrakhan Khanate attacked them from the rear, and in 1522, the Crimean forces launched a retaliatory campaign against Astrakhan. In 1523, the Nogais and Astrakhans invaded Crimea, significantly strengthening the Nogai Horde and negatively affecting the Kazakh Khanate's position near the Volga region. Between 1523 and 1525, the Nogais defeated the Kazakhs and pushed them eastward.

At this point, the center of power in the Kazakh Khanate shifted eastward to the Jetisu region. Khan Tahir and his closest entourage left Saray-Jük and moved toward southern Central Asia. Meanwhile, some Kazakh tribes remained in western Kazakhstan and even acknowledged the authority of the Nogai Horde. This shift signalled the end of the Kazakh Khanate’s previous expansionist policy westward. However, advancing southward was also challenging as the Uzbek Khanate of the Shaybanids remained a formidable force in the region.

Khan Tahir expelled the Moghuls from Jetisu, who, between 1514 and 1525, had attempted to restore their former positions in historical Moghulistan and push back the Kazakhs, who had controlled the region since the late fifteenth century. Despite this, Tahir managed to establish relations with the Moghul Khan Said based on their shared rivalry with the Shaybanids. However, Tahir’s position within the Kazakh Khanate itself was unstable. It was during this period that the historian Dulati wrote: ‘All the people fled from Tahir Khan in an instant.’

In all likelihood, the main problem seemed to be merely maintaining a central authority in Jetisu did not solve the Kazakh Khanate’s main challenge—securing control over agricultural lands and trade centers. Without these economic strongholds, state revenues did not grow, which, in turn, weakened the central government. During this period, internal political competition also intensified in the Kazakh Khanate, leading to the decentralization of power, and by the early 1530s, multiple khans were ruling simultaneously. Tahir Khan was succeeded by his brother Tugum, while others like Buidash and Haqnazar also held power, with Haqnazar ruling over the western part of the Kazakh Khanate. Naturally, this decentralization of authority limited the state's capabilities.

Against this backdrop, a significant change took place in 1533, when Said Khan in Moghulistan was succeeded by his son Abd-ar-Rashid. Unlike his father, Abd-ar-Rashid redirected Moghulistan’s foreign policy, altering the balance of power in the region. He formed an alliance against the Kazakhs together with the Shaybanids, and the alliance of the Uzbek Khanate and Moghulistan against the Kazakh Khanate placed the Kazakhs in an extremely difficult position. For two decades, until the 1550s, fierce battles raged in Jetisu and the surrounding territories. However, despite frequent defeats in battles against the Moghuls and Uzbeks, the Kazakh Khanate ultimately managed to retain control over the region.

By the 1550s, the geopolitical landscape in the Volga region had also changed. The forces of the Grand Principality of Moscow captured Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556. This led to significant shifts in steppe politics. The most crucial of these was that a chain of Russian fortresses along the Volga now effectively isolated the eastern and western parts of the Eurasian steppes from each other. This had an immediate impact on the Nogai Horde, which was spread across both banks of the lower Volga. Decentralization processes began within the Horde, accompanied by a partial dependency on the Grand Principality of Moscow. Internal conflicts arose over foreign policy orientation, whether to align with Moscow or Crimea, leading to a split within the Nogai Horde. Meanwhile, some of the Nogais in the east allied themselves with the Kazakhs.

The decline of the Nogai Horde provided a crucial opportunity for the Kazakh Khanate to consolidate its position. In 1568, Haqnazar Khan, along with the Kazakh sultans Shygai and Zhalym, launched a campaign against the Nogais and Astrakhan. By 1577, a full-scale war between the Kazakhs and Nogais was raging along the Jaiyq River. Haqnazar’s power grew as a result of the weakening of the Nogai Horde, and he began to lay claim to rule over the entire Kazakh Khanate.

By 1580, Haqnazar Khan had shifted focus to the southern frontiers of Central Asia, where he clashed with the Shaybanid ruler Baba Sultan, who was pursuing an independent policy on the northern borders of the Uzbek Khanate, in the region of the Syr Darya cities, and had sought support from Kazakh leaders. It was during this struggle that Haqnazar was killed in 1580.

Haqnazar’s death, which took place while contending for the role of the overarching Kazakh khan, at the hands of a peripheral Shaybanid ruler like Baba Sultan was also a consequence of decentralization. In a more unified state, under normal circumstances, the combined forces of the Kazakh Khanate would likely have been enough to defeat the troops of a single Shaybanid sultan, especially one who was already embroiled in conflict with the ruler of the Uzbek Khanate, Abdallah (Abdullah Khan). However, Haqnazar’s ability to mobilize troops was limited—he commanded only a portion of the Kazakh tribes, and their numbers were insufficient to secure victory over Baba Sultan.

The internal political turmoil in the Kazakh Khanate after Haqnazar's death is evident in Shygai Khan's forced departure to the south in 1581, seeking refuge with the Uzbek Khan Abdullah Khan II. Although Shygai was considered the rightful overall Kazakh khan after Haqnazar’s death, his need to leave the Kazakh Khanate suggests that he faced significant challenges in legitimizing his rule. This pattern of fleeing to southern regions of Central Asia in cases of internal disputes was not new—those who lost power within the Kazakh Khanate traditionally sought sanctuary in neighbouring countries, as in the case of Khan Burunduk.

However, within a few years, the political situation shifted again. In 1583, Shygai’s son Tauekel left Abdullah’s court and returned to the Kazakh Khanate. There, he had to fight for power against other Chinggisid families, and by 1598, after securing his position as the overall Kazakh khan, he launched a war against the Uzbek Khanate. During this conflict, Abdullah’s died, and his successor, his only son, Abd-al-Mumin, was killed in a conspiracy orchestrated by Uzbek tribal emirs.

As political chaos engulfed the Uzbek Khanate in the absence of central authority, Tauekel achieved significant successes. Kazakh forces occupied much of southern Central Asia, including Samarqand. However, the assault on Bukhara ended in failure—the Uzbek tribes managed to regroup and repel Tauekel’s army, and he was killed in battle.

For the Uzbek tribes, the looming prospect of defeat mirrored the situation in 1580, when Muhammad Shaybani’s Uzbeks defeated the Timurids. One consequence of that victory had been the migration of Chagatai tribes, who had served as the military elite of the Timurid state. If the Kazakh Khanate had conquered the Uzbek Khanate’s territory, the Kazakh tribes could have claimed steppe lands near local oases, traditionally occupied by nomadic tribes in their role as the military class.

The Uzbek tribes chose Jani Muhammad as their new khan, followed by his son Baki Muhammad from the Jochid dynasty, which became known as the Janids or Astrakhanids. The latter name derived from the city of Astrakhan, where the Janids had ruled as khans before the Grand Principality of Moscow conquered the city. This choice reflected the inevitable rivalry with the Kazakh Khanate and its Chinggisid dynasty. At the same time, as newcomers from the Volga region, the Ashtarkhanids were more dependent on the Uzbek tribes, which contributed to a relatively weak central authority in this new phase of the Uzbek Khanate.

As a result of the war for the southern lands of Central Asia in the late sixteenth century, the Kazakh Khanate gained control over strategically important Syr Darya cities, including Tashkent. Additionally, Kazakh Chinggisids began ruling in several interior regions—for instance, Ablai Sultan governed Fergana. Russian sources referred to him as ‘Ablah Khan’, the ruler of the Kazakh Hordes. Notably, the weakening of the Uzbek Khanate and its territorial losses along the Kazakh border also triggered decentralization processes within the Kazakh Khanate itself.

After Tauekel’s death, his brother Esim became the khan of all Kazakhs. However, another leader called Bahadur was also recognized as a khan at the time. The Persian-language chronicle Tarikh-i Shaybani states that in the autumn of 1603, Esim Khan and Bahadur Khan fought against the Qaraqalpaq-backed pretender Abd al-Ghaffar Sultan, a false Shaybanid, in Turkestan but suffered defeat. Subsequently, Abd al-Ghaffar seized control of Turkestan, Sayram, Tashkent, Aksikent, and Andijan. However, in the spring of 1605, Bahadur and Esim launched a surprise attack on him at Kara-Kamysh near Tashkent. According to the chronicle, ‘Esim killed Abd al-Ghaffar, and the Kazakhs once again took control of the Syr Darya cities, Tashkent and Fergana.’

In addition, Tursun Muhammad was also considered a Kazakh khan alongside Esim Khan. In 1613, he helped the Ashtarkhanid Imam Quli Khan defeat Esim Khan and other Kazakh rulers, who subsequently lost their territories in Fergana, Tashkent, and the cities along the Syr Darya. Esim Khan was forced to retreat to Eastern Turkestan, to the Moghuls. This was recorded in the chronicle of Shah Mahmud Churas: ‘From Tashkent, Ishim Khan, son of Shigay Khan the Kazakh, came to Abd al-Rahim Khan and became a mulasimiThe word mulasim comes from the Arabic mullāzim, and historically refers to a subordinate official, an attendant, or someone who serves a higher-ranking figure. In this context, it implies that Esim Khan entered the service of Abd al-Rahim Khan, likely as a political or military ally (retainer)..’

Additionally, the text Imam-Quli Khan-name by Suhail also names Ali, Nazar, and Kuchik as Kazakh khans in the first two decades of the seventeenth century. In 1624, Tursun Muhammad, in alliance with Esim Khan, launched a campaign against Andijan, and around 1626–27, Esim Khan defeated Tursun Muhammad.

Clearly, the political situation in the Kazakh Khanate was highly unstable. Internal struggles among different Chinggisid factions were intensified by the involvement of neighboring Uzbek tribes led by the Janids. The main conflict centered around the control of Tashkent and the strategically vital Syr Darya cities, which ultimately remained under Kazakh rule. Despite these power struggles, Esim Khan’s lineage retained the position of the overarching Kazakh khan. After Esim Khan’s death in 1628, his son Jangir ascended to the throne.

At the same time, significant regional shifts were reshaping the strategic landscape of the Kazakh Khanate. Chief among these was the large-scale expansion of the Mongolic Oirat tribes. Between 1613 and 1619, the Oirat Torgut tribe launched attacks on the Nogai Horde in the western territories of present-day Kazakhstan. In 1628, the Torguts crossed the Jaiyq River and advanced toward the Volga. Some of the Nogais submitted to Oirat rule, while others fled to the right bank of the Volga. The downfall of the Nogai Horde was largely caused by the decentralization of power that had taken place within the state. Consequently, the Oirat tribes went on to establish the Kalmyk Khanate in the Lower Volga region.

In 1635, the Dzungar state, led by the Oirat Choros clan, was founded in what is now the Xinjiang province in China. The rise of the Oirat tribes was closely linked to the Manchu conquest of southern Mongolia, beyond the Gobi Desert, and their ongoing campaign to subjugate northern China in the early seventeenth century. While some Oirats (the Torguts) moved westward in search of new pastures and agricultural trade markets, others (the Choros) began vying for dominance over Mongolia. This struggle unfolded in parallel with their efforts to establish relations with the rising Qing Empire, which was asserting control over China.

Another significant shift occurred in the early seventeenth century, when major trade routes between Asia and Europe were rerouted to maritime paths controlled by European powers. As a result, Central Asia lost much of its transit and economic significance, weakening local states both within and around this once-vital trade region. Naturally, this also impacted the Kazakh Khanate’s position and power.

Overall, against the backdrop of the growing strength and expansion of the Oirat tribes, the Kazakh Khanate found itself in a state of decentralized power. This weakened its ability to resist the Dzungars and Kalmyks, who, in contrast, had a high level of centralization due to the constant need to wage war. However, the Kazakh Khanate continued to maintain firm control over the Syr Darya cities and trade relations with southern Central Asia.

During the reign of Khan Zhangir, and especially his son Khan Tauke, trade revenues and taxes collected from the sedentary population largely ensured stability. This financial foundation played a crucial role in the struggle against the Dzungars from the east and the Kalmyks from the west.

Throughout the seventeenth century, these conflicts largely defined the region’s geopolitical landscape. Under Kalmyk pressure, the Nogai Horde in the Volga region effectively collapsed, and in the meanwhile, in Eastern Turkestan, the Oirat advance led to the downfall of the Moghul state. These events had profound consequences, particularly given that the Mongolic Oirat tribes were followers of Lamaist Buddhism, which reshaped the balance of power, as they not only challenged Islamic polities but also disrupted traditional alliances among steppe and sedentary states.

The rise of Kalmyk and Dzungar power posed a serious challenge to the Turkic-speaking Muslim population, including the Moghuls and Nogais. Moreover, the loss of their statehood, which had existed for a considerable time (since the late fourteenth century for the Moghuls and the late fifteenth century for the Nogais), left them with no real chance for a resurgence.

In this geopolitical landscape, the Kazakh Khanate, with a Turkic-speaking Muslim population, remained the most influential nomadic state in the Central Steppe in Eurasia. After the 1620s, periodic migrations of Nogai and Moghul tribes toward the Kazakh Khanate occurred. Moghulistan and the Nogai Horde had a long history of political relations with the Kazakh Khanate, and their populations had already developed a distinct identity. As a result, the incorporation of Moghul and Nogai tribes into the Kazakh Khanate needed to take on an organized form.

This structure likely took the form of the Kazakh jüzes (hordes). For example, Mikhail Vyatkin believed that ‘the Younger Horde (Junior Jüz) was formed during the disintegration of the Nogai Union and from elements that had been part of the Nogai Horde’.

Scholars like Bi-Arslan Kochekaev, Viktor Zhirmunsky, and Vadim Trepavlov hold a similar view. Meanwhile, Veniamin Yudin suggests that ‘the Kazakh Senior Jüz primarily formed from Moghul tribes’. Claudia Pishchulina further believes that ‘within Moghulistan, through the ethnopolitical unity of the Moghuls, both indigenous and newly arrived Turkic and Turkified tribes gradually crystallized into the Kazakh Senior Jüz.’

The Kazakh jüzes emerged roughly during the seventeenth century. By the time of Khan Tauke (1680–1715), they had already become the foundation of the Kazakh Khanate’s organization. However, during the reign of Khan Esim, jüzes did not yet exist. The political structure was based on the uluses of the Chinggisids, which is why many Chinggisid princes in the Kazakh Khanate laid claim to the title of khan.

This suggests that the jüzes were formed sometime between the 1630s and the 1670s. However, the division of Kazakh society into jüzes should not be seen as fragmentation but rather as a way of uniting related tribes. This process took place under the leadership of the strongest state in the region—the Kazakh Khanate—through political compromise.

Thus, the history of the Kazakh Khanate from the early sixteenth to the late seventeenth century was marked by numerous, often complex, events. The state vied with the Nogai Horde for dominance in the interfluve of the Jaiyq and Volga rivers, fought Moghulistan over the Semirechye region, and clashed with the Uzbek Khanate over the cities along the Syr Darya. Its political organization fluctuated between centralization and decentralization.

However, the most significant aspect of this period was that the Kazakh Khanate endured these challenges while preserving its statehood and the identity of its people. Facing external pressures from the Dzungars and Kalmyks, it successfully integrated the related Moghul and Nogai tribes into its structure, preparing for the next complex stage of its history.