Game of Thrones: The Beginning

From the 1440s, however, the descendants of Edigu, an influential Mongol military commander, began to play a greater role in shaping the politics of the steppe. At first, they played an active role in the political life of various existing states across the region, from the North Caucasus to the Syr Darya. Notably, the sixteen-year-old Abu'l-Khayr Khan’s rise to power in 1428 was substantially driven by the support of Edigu’s familyi Трепавлов В.В. История Ногайской Орды. / Отв. ред. М. А. Усманов. 2-е изд., испр. и доп. — Казань, 2016. С. 87. . Ultimately, their growing influence led to the formation of a new state known as the Nogai Ulus or the Nogai Horde.

The formation of these states was not a peaceful process—it was marked by intense struggles among rival political forces. At first, the conflict was for control over the Ulus of Jochi and then for dominance over its separate territories. For example, the establishment of the Kazan Khanate in 1437 was linked to the actions of Ulugh Muhammad, a khan from the Ulus of Jochi, who lost the central power struggle and then sought to establish his own domain.

Primarily, these rulers were Chinggisids, members of the ruling dynasty of the Ulus of Jochi. However, they also included representatives of the non-Chinggisid aristocracy, including the descendants of Edigu. The emergence of new states was largely driven by the ambitions of various Chinggisid families to claim parts of the disintegrating Ulus of Jochi when total control was no longer possible. A notable example was the rise of the Khanate of the Nomadic Uzbeks. In 1428, a new dynasty from the Shaybanid family came to power in the Kazakh steppes, forming part of the Ulus of Jochi’s left wing, an important segment within its military–political framework.

The left wing of the Ulus of Jochi had its own ruling dynasty, whose origins remain a subject of debate among Kazakh historians. While this may seem like a niche academic discussion, it offers key insights into how the Kazakh Khanate was formed. The disintegration of the Ulus of Jochi was not a simple collapse—it played out through dynastic conflicts among different Chinggisid families. The emergence and establishment of the Kazakh Khanate was inevitably connected to this process. After all, the origins of its ruling dynasty were of great importance, as they represented the very foundations of the Kazakh Khanate.

Fundamentally, the debate among historians revolves around which branch of the Chinggisid family the first Kazakh khans belonged to. One hypothesis suggests they were descendants of Orda Ejen (or Orda Ichen) Khan, the elder brother of Batu Khan, the founder of the Ulus of JochiiСултанов Т. Поднятые на белой кошме. Потомки Чингисхана. Алматы, 2001. С. 140-144. Ускенбай К. Восточный Дашт-и Кыпчак в XIII – начале XV века. Проблемы этнополитической истории Улуса Джучи. Казань: «Фэн» АН РТ, 2013. С. 178-184. . Another theory argues that they descended from Tuqa-Temür, another of Jochi’s sons and brother to Batu and OrdaiАбусеитова М. Казахстан и Центральная Азия в XV–XVII вв.: история, политика, дипломатия. — Алматы, 1998. С. 76–77. Сабитов Ж. Улусы Тукай-Тимура и Тукай-Тимуридов в 1227–1359 годах // Золотоордынская цивилизация. 2017. № 10. С. 256-260. Сабитов Ж. М. Ак-Ордынская и Золотоордынская парадигмы в медиевистике Казахстана // Сборник материалов 1 Конгресса "История Тюркской государственности" — Астана, 2024. С. 400–420. .

Why does this matter? If the Kazakh khans belonged to Orda’s lineage, they were part of the ruling dynasty of the Ulus of Jochi’s left wing from the very beginning, giving them a strong claim to legitimate rule over the Kazakh steppes, the traditional territory of the left wing. Consequently, however, their rivals—including Abu'l-Khayr Khan from the Shaybanid family or the earlier Tokhtamysh Khan from the Tuqa-Timurids—had their own ambitions and sought to challenge their legitimacy.

If, however, they were descended from Tuqa-Temür, things would be a little different. They then represented a Chinggisid lineage that had, at some point in history, displaced Orda’s dynasty as rulers of the left wing. This shift likely occurred during the peak of the Ulus of Jochi, a period of relative stability before the onset of major upheavals. The period of true turmoil came between the 1360s and 1380s, a time of political chaos in the Ulus of Jochi, referred to in Russian sources as Velikaya Zamyatnyaii Сорогин Е. Причины «Великой замятни» как общего кризиса высокоразвитого кочевого общества. // Северный регион: Наука, Образование, Культура. 2007, № 2. Стр. 91–100. or the Great Disorder.

At that time, the left wing of the Ulus of Jochi was led by Urus Khan (the eighth khan of the White Horde and a disputed khan of the Blue Horde), who fought against Tokhtamysh and his supporter, the Central Asian ruler Timur. Urus Khan was, in fact, Janibek and Kerei’s great-grandfather. Meanwhile, Tokhtamysh, a Tuqa-Timurid, relying on external support, sought to seize power in the left wing of the Ulus of Jochi from Urus Khan and his heirs. He had personal motives for this—Urus Khan had ordered the execution of Tuy Khwāja-Oglan, Tokhtamysh’s father, who had been an emir in Mangyshlak.

The key point of intrigue here lies in the fact that nearly all the founders of the various Chinggisid dynasties in the western part of the Ulus of Jochi—such those who established the Astrakhan, Crimean, and Kazan khanates—were descendants of Tokhtamysh. It was with him that the dominance of the Tuqa-Timurids in the Ulus of Jochi truly began. However, Tokhtamysh’s father was not a khan: his name bore the title ‘Oglan’, which signified a Chinggisid who did not belong to the ruling khan’s dynasty.

Based on known historical facts, the primary political struggle in the left wing of the Ulus of Jochi from the late fourteenth to the mid-fifteenth century revolved around the rivalry between Urus Khan’s family and Tokhtamysh. The latter’s Tuqa-Timurid lineage is well established, whereas the origins of Urus Khan remain a subject of scholarly debate.

Some historians rely on several different sources to assert that Urus Khan was a Tuqa-Timurid, including Mu‘izz al-Ansāb (Glorifier of Genealogies Concerning the Ancestral Tree), Nusrat-nāma (The Book of Victories), the works of Abu al-Ghazi Bahadur, Chingiz-nāma (The Book of Chinggis), and Bahr al-Ansāb (The Sea of Genealogies). According to these sources, Urus Khan descended from a Badak or Badakul-Oglan, believed to have been a Tuqa-Timurid.

However, another group of historical sources—Muntakhab at-Tawarikh-i Mu‘ini (known as The Anonymous of Iskander), Nosakh-e jahan-ara (The World-Adorning Texts), Tarikh-i Haidari (The History of Haidar), and Jami‘ ad-Duwal (Compendium of States)—presents a different genealogy. According to them, Urus Khan’s father was Chimtay, his grandfather was Erzen, and his great-grandfather was Sasy-Buka.

It is important to note that these three Chinggisids are well-documented historical figures. They successively ruled as khans of the left wing of the Ulus of Jochi, making Urus Khan’s continuity within the ruling dynasty quite clear. In contrast, Badak or Badakul Oglan is mentioned only in the first group of sources and nowhere else in historical records.

This raises a natural question: why would an alternative lineage emerge, suggesting that an obscure figure like Badak (Badakul), a Tuqa-Timurid, could have overthrown the Orduids, the descendants of Orda Ejen and the established rulers of the left wing, and replaced the legitimate ruling dynasty? Such an event would have been monumental within the Ulus of Jochi, yet it remains conspicuously absent from most historical sources. Moreover, if Tui-Khodja Oglan, who was definitively a Tuqa-Timurid, remained merely an oglan at the beginning of the crisis in the left wing, why would he have needed to fight Urus Khan for power at all?

In this case, it is significant that the two oldest documents mentioning Urus Khan’s lineage were written in the early fifteenth century. The Anonymous of Iskander was compiled in Shiraz in 1413–14, while Mu‘izz al-Ansāb was written in 1426. The first book states that Urus Khan was the son of Chimtay and an Orduid by origin, while the second claims he was the son of Badak (Badakul), a Tuqa-Timurid.

The key nuance here lies in the fact that both documents were created during the reign of the Timurid ruler Shahrukh, the son of Timur, and were dedicated to him. This context is crucial, because during Timur’s rule and that of his descendants, multiple versions of history were actively constructed. This was necessary to legitimize their authority in a political landscape where political power was tied to Chinggisid ancestry. Thus, to solidify their rule, they had to craft narratives that aligned with Chinggisid traditions, justifying their authority in the eyes of their subjects and rivals. Thus, multiple versions of history emerged, each tailored to reinforce their claims to power.

As Justin Marozzi wrote in Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World:

Notably, later in Herat, a Timurid court historian named Khwandamir formulated a historical version claiming that the Barlas tribe, from which Timur originated, supposedly descended from a certain Khajulai Baghaturi‘Baghatur’ is a historical Turkic and Mongol honorific title, originally used as a term for ‘hero’ or ‘valiant warrior’.. This figure was allegedly the younger brother of Khabul Khan, the first Mongol khan, and the great-grandfather of Chinggis Khan. Further, it was claimed that they had made an agreement in which the elder brother would become khan while the younger would serve as a military commander. Thus, Khwandamir sought to legitimize Timurid rule by asserting their direct connection to Chinggis Khan’s lineagei Почекаев Р.Ю. Легитимация власти, узурпаторство и самозванство в государствах Евразии. Тюрко-монгольский мир XIII–начала XX в. — М., 2024. С. 83. . Clearly, this manipulation was crafted for very specific political purposes.

The very fact that different versions of Urus Khan’s origin were written at the court of the same Timurid ruler—Shahrukh—raises questions about the possibility of such manipulation. Moreover, a later document, which specifically asserts Urus Khan’s descent from Tuqa-Temür, appears to be a deliberate textual intervention. It is in this context that the figure of Badak emerges as Urus Khan’s ancestor.

Notably, during the 1420s, a power struggle involving both the Shaybanids and the descendants of Urus Khan was unfolding in the left wing of the Ulus of Jochi. For the Timurids, the rise of the latter meant a return to the conflicts of the 1370s, when Shahrukh’s father, Timur, had fought against Urus Khan and his heirs, an era when they had to contend with the united forces of nomads from the Kazakh steppes.

In this context, Shaybanid Abu'l-Khayr’s ascension to power in the left wing of the Jochi Ulus in 1428, when he was only sixteen years old, was a more favorable outcome for the Timurids. Given his rather questionable legitimacy, Abu'l-Khayr clearly needed time to consolidate his rule in the steppe. If we consider why Shahrukh might have engaged in such a manipulation, the answer may lie in his wanting to diminish the legitimacy of Urus Khan’s descendants in comparison to the Timurids themselves. Thus, it is quite possible that in 1426, Shahrukh deliberately altered the data in Mu‘izz al-Ansāb, whereas, in 1414, he had no such motive.

Thus, in all likelihood, it was the Timurid Shahrukh who created this confusion, which still fuels debates among Kazakh historians about the origins of the Kazakh khans. This is understandable because the Kazakh Khanate—like the Crimean, Kazan, Astrakhan, and Uzbek khanates and the Nogai Horde—emerged during the collapse of the Ulus of Jochi. This process was primarily driven by dynastic wars, making the origins of the ruling dynasty a matter of significance.

Around 1465, though the exact date is unknown, the descendants of Urus Khan, Janibek, and Kerei rebelled against the Shaybanid Abu'l-Khayr. They were supported by some of the tribes of the State of the Nomadic Uzbeks. However, they were still outnumbered by those who remained loyal to Abu'l-Khayr. As a result, they were forced to migrate to the historical region of Semirechye (Zhetysu), nestled between the Alatau Mountains and Lake Balkhash. At the time, this area was under the control of Moghulistan, a state that had emerged as a successor to the Chagatai Khanate.

Thus, in all likelihood, it was the Timurid Shahrukh who created this confusion, which still fuels debates among Kazakh historians about the origins of the Kazakh khans. This is understandable because the Kazakh Khanate—like the Crimean, Kazan, Astrakhan, and Uzbek khanates and the Nogai Horde—emerged during the collapse of the Ulus of Jochi. This process was primarily driven by dynastic wars, making the origins of the ruling dynasty a matter of significance.

Around 1465, though the exact date is unknown, the descendants of Urus Khan, Janibek, and Kerei rebelled against the Shaybanid Abu'l-Khayr. They were supported by some of the tribes of the State of the Nomadic Uzbeks. However, they were still outnumbered by those who remained loyal to Abu'l-Khayr. As a result, they were forced to migrate to the historical region of Semirechye (Zhetysu), nestled between the Alatau Mountains and Lake Balkhash. At the time, this area was under the control of Moghulistan, a state that had emerged as a successor to the Chagatai Khanate.

It is necessary to understand the logic behind the emergence of broad collective identities such as Uzbeks, Moghuls, Kazakhs, Chagatais, Nogais, Crimean Tatars, and others. All these names appeared during the decline of the Chinggisid state tradition, which had taken shape during the formation of the Mongol Empire. Before this point, the primary structural unit in various Mongol states was the ulus, led by a Chinggisid ruler. In turn, the ulus was composed of military ‘thousands’, which were formed by people of a variety of tribal origins, including Mongolic, Turkic, and others.

This was a distinctive feature of the organization of the Mongol Empire. Chinggis Khan arbitrarily formed military ‘thousands’ based on practical necessity rather than tribal affiliation. However, he almost always appointed loyal commanders to lead them, nearly all of whom came from the small tribes of Mongolia who had supported him in the early stages of his struggle for poweri Акимбеков С.М. История степей. Феномен государства Чингисхана в истории Евразии. — Алматы, 2021. С. 182–184. .

At the same time, Turkic-speaking tribes dominated in the steppes of Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus, the Black Sea region, the steppes bordering China, and Central Asia. They were also part of the armies of nearly all the Muslim rulers of the East, from Egypt to India. As a result, in the Mongol Empire, Turks made up the majority of the ‘military thousands’ in the Mongol army, especially in the western uluses of the empire—those of Jochi, Chagatai, and Hulegu. Over time, the army and the ruling dynasties in these regions began using different variants of the Turkic language. In the Hulegu ulus (Iran), they adopted an Oghuz variant; in the Jochi ulus, a Kipchak variant; and in the Chagatai ulus, a Karluk variant. Meanwhile, the administrative language in all these uluses was ‘Central Asian Turkic’, which was closely related to the Karluk version.

However, the political organization in all these states remained Chinggisid or Mongoliani Там же. С. 189. . Tribes did not appear as independent political entities until the mid-fourteenth century. However, as the crisis of the Chinggisid political tradition deepened, certain tribes began to strengthen, breaking away from the political system and assuming a more autonomous role.

For example, Timur came from the Barlas tribe. Along with several other Central Asian tribes, they formed a tribal union under the general name of the Chagatais, a tribute to the Chinggisid tradition, which still retained its influence. Meanwhile, in the eastern part of the former Ulus of Chagatai, another union emerged, whose tribes became known as the Moghuls, and the state they founded was called Moghulistani Robinson D. Eurasia after the Fall // In the Shadow of the Mongol Empire. Ming China and Eurasia. Published online by Cambridge University Press 17 October 2019. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108687645.003 . The name itself was a clear reference to the Mongols of the earlier Mongol Empire, but the slight modification of the name reflected the changes that had taken place, particularly the fact that they were now Turkic-speaking.

A similar process took place in the Ulus of Jochi. The crisis of the Chinggisid political tradition, driven by ongoing wars, created conditions for the rise of tribes that each functioned as a military class. The emergence of the State of the Nomadic Uzbeks reflected this new reality, distinguishing them from related tribes in the western part of the Ulus of Jochi. However, this designation was not yet a stable marker of self-identification for all tribes in the eastern wing of the Ulus of Jochi. Over time, the identity formed under Abu'l-Khayr Khan gave rise to distinct groups, including the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs, and the Nogais.

The crisis of the 1460s in the State of the Nomadic Uzbeks led to the secession of a group of tribes led by Janibek and Kerei, descendants of Urus Khan. For them, Shaybanid Abu'l-Khayr was not a legitimate enough ruler. In other words, the secession was a political decision. Since the tribes loyal to Janibek and Kerei migrated to Moghulistan, they came to be known as the ‘Kazaks’. This designation was directly linked to their separation from the State of the Nomadic Uzbeks and reflected their desire to emphasize the differences associated with their distinct identity.

Since the first half of the fifteenth century, the term ‘Kazak’ has been widely used across regions influenced by the Chinggisid tradition. It was applied both before and after the migration of Janibek and Kerei. ‘Kazak’ or ‘Kazak-ing’ (казакование), as a distinct process, generally referred to a change, often temporary, in the social status of an individual or a group within various Mongol states.

For example, Muhammad Haidar Dughlat wrote that the Timurid Abu Sa'id Mirza (1424–69) ‘suffered defeat and spent a long time “Kazak-ing” near the borders of Maverannahr and Turkestan.i Ахмедов Б.А. Государство кочевых узбеков. — М., 1965. С. 129. ’. In Moghulistan, Sultan Uvais Khan (who died in 1428) ‘separated from his uncle Shir Muhammad Khan and engaged in Kazak-ing.i Мухаммед Хайдар Дулати. Тарих-и Рашиди. — Алматы, 1999. С. 94. ’ The Timurid historian Abd al-Razzaq Samarqandi noted that in 1440–41, ‘at times, some members of the Uzbek army, having become Kazaks, would come to Mazandaran.’iТизенгаузен В. Сборник материалов, относящихся к истории Золотой Орды. Т. I. — СПб., 1884. С. 199. . According to the Timurid Babur, during the late fifteenth-century Timurid wars in Central Asia, ‘Khodai Berdy Tugchi attacked the Kazaks of Tanbal two or three times. From the vicinity of Osh, our brave young Kazaks tirelessly and boldly drove away the enemy's herds, greatly weakening themiБабур-наме. Записки Бабура. — Ташкент, 1993. С. 92. .’ In this case, it is notable that Central Asian warriors and elites from among the Chagatais (such as Abu Sa'id, Babur, and Tanbal) and the Moghuls (such as Uwais Khan) would temporarily assume the status of Kazaks in times of war or political transition.

The events of 1481 are also highly illustrative in this context. That year, the Shaybanid Ibak Khan from Tyumen, along with the descendants of Edigu, Musa, and Yamgurchi, and ‘15,000 Kazakhs’iТрепавлов В.В. История Ногайской Орды. — М., 2001. С. 491. attacked the camp of Akhmet, the khan of the Great Horde and a descendant of Tuqa-Temür, and killed him. Later, Musa and Yamgurchi’s supporters would be known as the Nogais, while the nomads from Siberia would come to be called Siberian Tatars.

Thus, the term ‘Kazak’ referred to the warriors and elites of Chinggisid states who were either engaged in war or had temporarily changed their status due to temporary exile following a military defeat or special training for major events. In any case, the origins of the term were closely tied to military affairs and were widely applied across the regions where the Chinggisid political tradition held sway. Notably, ‘Kazak’ continued to be used even when Janibek and Kerei established the first Kazakh Khanate, and over time, it became firmly associated with its population.

However, it is important to note that when these khans took power in 1470 in the former state of the Shaybanid Abu'l-Khayr, this territory still included the tribes who would later form the core of the Uzbek Khanate in Central Asia and the Nogai Horde in the steppes of western Kazakhstan, the Volga region, and the North Caucasus. By the late fifteenth century, the descendants of Edigu had established an independent Nogai Horde in the Volga region. Meanwhile, at the very beginning of the sixteenth century, the Shaybanid Muhammad Shaybani conquered Central Asia, forcing the Timurids out of the region. Along with Muhammad Shaybani, a significant portion of the local tribes left the Kazakh steppes. Under the name ‘Uzbeks’, they replaced the Chagatais as the military elite of the new Uzbek Khanate that the Shaybanids established in Central Asia.

The Kazakh Khanate united the tribes that remained in the steppes of present-day Kazakhstan. In the very late fifteenth century, under the leadership of Khan Burunduk, the son of Kerei, the Kazakh Khanate waged wars against Muhammad Shaybani in the region of the cities around the Syr Darya. Initially, the Kazakhs faced opposition from the Moghuls under the command of Sultan Mahmud Khan, but later, the two joined forces to fight against Muhammad Shaybani. At the end of these wars, the Syr Darya cities ultimately remained under Shaybani’s control, and he went on to establish the Uzbek Khanate.

In 1511, a major political crisis occurred in the Kazakh Khanate, leading to Khan Burunduk losing power and being replaced by Janibek’s son Kasym. By 1520, Kasym shifted his focus to the Volga region, bringing some of the Nogais living there under his authority. Around this time, the tribes from the former left wing of Jochi’s Ulus underwent their final division into Kazakhs, Nogais, and Uzbeks.

Notably, when Muhammad Shaybani launched a campaign into the Kazakh steppes in 1509, one of the Shaybanids, Ubaydullah Sultan, explained the difference between Kazakhs and Uzbeks to the Persian historian Fazlallah ibn Ruzbihan Isfahani, who asked, ‘The Kazakh troops, though their actions do not align with divine law, nevertheless share an external kinship with you and are connected to you by ancestry and blood.’ Ubaydullah responded, ‘Wars and conflicts between us have so thoroughly covered our souls with the dust of mutual resentment that we have shaken off from our hearts the dust of mutual love.iФазлаллах ибн Рузбехан Исфахани. Мехман-наме-и Бухара. (Записки бухарского гостя) — М., 1976. С.68-69. ’ Ruzbihan was not entirely satisfied with this explanation, writing later, ‘the Uzbeks of Kazakh lineage were breaking away from the forces of the Uzbek ShaybanidsiТам же™. С. 123. .’

By the early sixteenth century, the formation of new identities among the nomads of the former Ulus of Jochi was complete, accompanied by the emergence of new states. As a result, Kazakh, Uzbek, and Nogai identities took shape within the Kazakh and Uzbek khanates as well as in the Nogai Horde. Over time, the Uzbek Khanate ceased to exist under that name, and the Nogai Horde lost its political independence. The Kazakh Khanate, though significantly weakened, endured until the early nineteenth century. However, it all began with the political transformations triggered by the crisis of the Ulus of Jochi.