The Kazakh Khanate and the Russian Empire

At the same time, the Russian Empire was actively engaged in offensive wars in the northern Black Sea region, seeking access to the coast of the Black Sea and the North Caucasus. In the initial phase of these wars, Russia's interest in the Kazakh steppe remained passive. However, their conclusion marked a shift toward a more active Russian policy regarding the Kazakh khanates. During this period, the geopolitical situation for the Kazakh khanates began to change gradually, and they were largely unprepared for it.

Nonetheless, in the 1770s, the situation still appeared relatively stable. In Turkestan, the khan was Ablai, who was considered the most authoritative ruler in the entire Kazakh steppe. In 1771, the Kalmyk Khanate ceased to exist, paving the way for the Junior Jüz to expand into the interfluve of the Ural (Yaik) and Volga rivers. At around the same time, Kazakh tribes actively began to settle in the eastern territories that became available after the fall of the Dzungar Khanate. They also took control of the Mangyshlak peninsula and profited from the transit trade between Russia and Central Asia.

In 1773, the Pugachev Rebellion erupted in the Russian Empire, turning the frontier into a crisis zone for nearly two years. During this period, representatives of the central Russian administration along the border found themselves in an extremely vulnerable position.

The Kazakhs of the Junior Jüz actively crossed to the right bank of the Yaik River, disregarding previous restrictions. Given the ongoing rebellion, Russian authorities grew increasingly concerned about border security. The governor of Astrakhan, Krechetikov wrote:

This again highlights the largely nominal nature of the Kazakh khanates’ dependence on Russia. Empress Catherine II’s government attempted to enlist Kazakh support in suppressing Pugachev’s rebellion, but these efforts were unsuccessful. In a letter to Catherine dated 15 May 1774, Nuraly Khan explained that he had dispatched troops against Pugachev in the earliest stages of the uprising, when he was particularly vulnerable. However, ‘heavy snow, a fierce blizzard, and foul weather then raging did compel our forces to turn back.’

This response clearly demonstrated Nuraly Khan’s practical independence in decision-making. Notably, in response, Catherine II sent Nuraly a letter thanking him for his assistance in the fight against Pugachev. However, in a secret directive to the governor of Orenburg, Reinsdorp, she wrote:

At that time, however, the Russian Empire lacked the capacity to act on this threat.

The issue was not so much the direct consequences of Pugachev’s rebellion but rather the ‘steppe barrier’—the challenge of conducting military operations in the open steppe with regular troops. Waging war in this terrain required logistical support points and a supply system, both of which were severely disrupted by the Pugachev uprising and the simultaneous Bashkir rebellion, leaving the Russian Empire without mobile forces. Additionally, in 1771, Russia lost its Kalmyk cavalry, further limiting its ability to conduct military campaigns in the steppe for some time.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1775, Russian authorities officially allowed the Kazakhs to cross to the right bank of the Yaik River, although this was merely an acknowledgment of an existing reality as Kazakh tribes were already actively present in the area. However, this period of Russia’s relative weakness along the frontier soon came to an end. The situation for the Kazakh khanates deteriorated as the former Yaik Cossack army was now transformed into a military formation in the service of the empire, along with detachments of Bashkirs and certain peoples of the Volga region, significantly altering the military situation along the border.

Until the early 1780s, little had changed. However, in December 1782, the Russian Empire issued a decree allowing Kazakh migrations to the right bank of the Ural River only on the condition of land rental. To do so, Kazakhs first had to find landowners willing to lease them land. If no such landowners could be found, they were prohibited from migrating. It is also important to note that the lands of the Ural Cossack Army lay along the river, which strongly opposed Kazakh resettlement on the right bank of the Yaik.

Given these circumstances, the Kazakhs began launching attacks on Russian forts all along the border starting in early 1783. This was largely due to the de facto ban on crossing the Yaik. In July 1783, Empress Catherine II sent a letter to the governor of Simbirsk and Ufa, Apukhtin, demanding an end to the Kazakh raids. At the same time, she inquired about the reasons behind the unrest, asking whether it had been caused by ‘the conduct of any officials on the border’.

Between 1783 and 1784, continuous clashes occurred along the entire border, with the reconstituted Ural Cossack army—restored after Pugachev's Rebellion—actively participating. In 1783, during a battle near the Topolinsky outpost, the Ural Cossacks captured Syrym Batyr of the Baibakty clan, who had previously taken the Cossack officer Chaganov prisoner and sold him in Khiva. A year later, Nuraly Khan himself ransomed Syrym from captivity. However, in 1785, during a battle near the Sakharnaya fortress, the Ural Cossacks defeated a detachment led by Apak, Nuraly’s nephew, and took his brother, Aishuak, prisoner.

Additionally, between 1783 and 1785, a de facto border war took place between the Kazakhs of the Junior Jüz and the Russian Empire, with the Kazakh forces consisting of both tribal groups and individual members of the Chingissid dynasty. This conflict significantly weakened Khan Nuraly's position within the Junior Jüz as he found himself caught between the Kazakh tribes and the Russian administration. As historian Mikhail Vyatkin wrote: ‘Nuraly Khan ultimately became a tsarist official bearing the title of khan, becoming a representative not of Kazakh statehood, but of Russian statehood in the Kazakh steppe.’

Thus, the issue was not simply that Nuraly Khan maintained relations with the Russian administration. From his perspective, this was a logical step as Kazakh access to trade markets in border towns and permission to migrate beyond the Yaik depended on Russia. Additionally, transit trade between Russia and Central Asia was an important source of revenue. However, Nuraly faced difficulties because the tribal elite of the Junior Jüz at the time had no interest in a strong khanate. Ultimately, the conflict between Nuraly’s family and the tribal elite, led by Syrym, reflected the broader political dynamics of the Junior Jüz in the late eighteenth century.

In the summer of 1785, the Russian administration in Orenburg established direct contact with the tribal elite of the Junior Jüz, led by Syrym. In September of that year, a meeting that included both the Kazakhs and representatives of the Russian Empire was held. The Russian officials were given a secret directive stating that ‘it would be more beneficial for the Kyrgyz [Kazakhs] to have no khan at all and to be directly subordinate to the Border Court established in Orenburg and the chief border commander.’

From the Russian perspective, the goal essentially was to dismantle the state structure of the Junior Jüz by abolishing the khanate and placing it under the direct administration of Russian imperial authorities. The mention of the border commander as the governing authority is especially telling—despite all official documents asserting Kazakh dependence on the Russian Empire, by the late eighteenth century, Russian officials de facto acknowledged the existence of a border between them.

However, the Kazakh tribal elite did not perceive these developments as a loss of statehood. Formally, they sought to remove Nuraly Khan with Russian support, but they did not intend to eliminate the khanate itself. Instead, the powerful tribes sought to install a puppet khan from among the Chingissids, much like in the Khivan Khanate in the eighteenth century. The idea of abolishing the khanate altogether was too radical for them. They were not eager to replace Nuraly Khan’s rule, which they viewed as burdensome, with the even more oppressive authority of the Russian Empire.

Thus, the former Khivan Khan Kaip, the son of Khan Batyr, emerged as a candidate. He had already been recognized as a khan in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya by the Kazakh tribes of Shekty and Tortkara. However, this was unacceptable to Russia, not only because it aimed to abolish the khanate in the Junior Jüz altogether but also because the lower Syr Darya region remained beyond Russia's reach in the late eighteenth century. This meant that any khan from that area would be too independent for their liking.

In 1786, Nuraly left the territory of the Junior Jüz and remained in Russia with Sultan Ayshuak. During this time, the governor of Orenburg, Igelstrom, established administrative units called raspravy for each of the tribal groups of the Junior Jüz: Bayuly, Alimuly, and Jetyru. However, there was no talk yet of appointing Russian officials, and administrative affairs were conducted by local mullahs.

That same year, Nuraly's son, Sultan Esim, captured Syrym Batyr. Meanwhile, the tribal elite held a council without Syrym’s participation and endorsed the creation of the Border Court. They selected Sultan Ishmukhamet, a nephew of Kayip Khan, as a member, but Russian authorities ultimately removed his candidacy. While they were unwilling to allow a new khan to emerge, they did, however, permit Kazakhs to migrate to the right bank of the Yaik.

In August 1787, Esim released Syrym, and in September, Igelstrom organized a gathering of tribal nobility on the Khobda River, where the raspravy were formally established, and an oath of allegiance to Russia was sworn. However, Syrym and several other tribal leaders did not sign the oath despite participating in the election of senior clan elders and members of the raspravy. As a result, the raspravy system never became fully operational. The tribal elite did not see them as genuine institutions, as their primary goals remained the expulsion of Khan Nuraly and gaining access to the right bank of the Yaik River.

In 1791, Nuraly Khan died, marking the end of an era in the history of eighteenth-century Kazakh statehood. His brother Sultan Yeraly was elected as the new khan, reflecting a shift in Russian policy and took place near the Orsk fortress in the presence of Russian troops. Given the ongoing crisis in relations with the tribal elite, Russian authorities decided to support Nuraly's family once again, but under new, more subordinate conditions.

However, in July 1792, the tribal leaders convened their own assembly and elected Sultan Yesenali, son of Nuraly, as khan. Of particular interest is the letter that Syrym and his supporters wrote expressing their grievances to the new governor, Peutling:

From 1792 to 1793, intense battles took place along the border between the Russian forces and Syrym's supporters, with Khan Yeraly’s followers fighting on Russia’s side. When Yeraly died in 1794, the new governor, Vyazmitinov, effectively appointed Sultan Esim, Nuraly’s son, as khan. However, in May 1797, Syrym's supporters assassinated Khan Esim a few kilometers from the Krasnoyarsk fortress.

This was a severe crisis of power, and upon his return to Orenburg, Governor Igelstrom proposed the creation of a Khanate Council headed by the elderly Sultan Aishuak. Syrym himself joined the council, having been elected as the senior leader of the Baiuly tribal confederation. However, at the same time, other members of Nuraly's family held their own assembly and elected Sultan Qaratai as khan, putting themselves in direct conflict with the Russian authorities. The latter were unable to fully control the steppe territories down to the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, which meant that their opponents always had the option to migrate south.

As a result, Russian authorities decided to divide the Junior Jüz in order to weaken it. This also allowed them to take the interfluve between the Yaik and Volga off the table in Kazakh-Russian relations. In 1801, the Bukey Khanate, led by Sultan Bukey, was established in this region. It became the first fully dependent Kazakh administrative entity, directly governed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, unlike the other tribes of the Junior Jüz, whose affairs were handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, it was subordinate to the Astrakhan governor.

In 1805, Aishuak's son Zhantore became the new khan of the Junior Jüz, and in 1806, Nuraly's sons once again elected Qaratai as khan. Meanwhile, until 1815, Sultan Abulgazy, the son of Khan Kaip, was recognized as khan in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya. By the early nineteenth century, the Junior Jüz had somehow ended up with four khans. In 1809, Khan Qaratai killed Khan Zhantore, and in 1811, Zhantore's brother Sultan Shirgazy became khan.

It was clear that even though the Russian Empire still lacked the ability to fully control the steppe territories, this was the final agony of Kazakh statehood. In 1811, Russia began constructing the Iletsk Line, which by 1823 would cut off part of Kazakh lands, further weakening the remaining Kazakhs of the Junior Jüz. At the same time, during the 1810s, the Khivan and Kokand khanates began expanding into the Syr Darya region. The military-political situation changed drastically, and the absence of a central authority in the Kazakh khanates led to southern tribes suffering defeats at the hands of the more centralized states of Central Asia.

In 1815, Aringazy, the son of Khan Abulgazy, became khan in the southern Junior Jüz and attempted to organize resistance against the Khivan advance. At the same time, he pursued a policy of centralization based on Islamic law, seeking support among the Kazakh tribes of the northern Junior Jüz and, through them, from the Russian authorities. In 1821, Russia appointed him head of the Khanate Council, but in the same year, he was called to Russia and placed under house arrest in Kaluga, where he died in 1833. In 1824, Khan Shirgazy was summoned to Orenburg and forced to remain there permanently. With that, the khanate rule in the Junior Jüz came to an end.

The situation in the Middle Jüz unfolded with less drama. After the death of Ablai Khan in 1781, his son Wali became his successor and was recognized as the khan of the Middle Jüz by both the Qing and Russian empires. However, he lacked his father’s authority, and his influence within Kazakh society gradually declined. Nevertheless, Kazakh tribes still controlled the cities along the Syr Darya, including Turkestan.

However, Khan Wali had little real power near the Russian border, and the Russian government began ‘betting on weak representatives who could discredit the idea of khanate rule’. In 1816, the Russian administration recognized Sultan Bukey, the son of Sultan Barak, as khan, while the Kipchak tribe from the Tobol region elected Sultan Zhantore, a descendant of Khan Kaip, and the Argyn tribe from the Turgay region chose Sultan Zhumazhan as their khan. Around this time, some Kazakh tribes migrated beyond the line of Russian border fortresses.

It is important to note that due to the existence of serfdom in Russia at the time, Russian peasants could not settle these newly annexed Kazakh steppe territories. As a result, they were actively populated by the Kazakhs of the Middle Jüz. Russian Colonel Bronevsky wrote:

Levshin wrote that in 1797, the migration of 12,000 kibitkas from the Middle Jüz into Russian territory was permitted. Notably, this migration was regarded in terms of acquiring subjecthood, indicating that, in the early nineteenth century, Russian authorities did not yet consider the Kazakhs their subjects.

In 1817, Khan Bukey of the Middle Jüz passed away, followed by Khan Wali in 1819. By this time, the reforms led by Mikhail Speransky in the Kazakh steppe had begun, establishing administrative districts (okrugs). In 1819, Russia decided to abolish the khanate in the Middle Jüz, and in 1822, Sultan Gubaidulla, the son and heir of Khan Wali, was appointed aga sultan of the Kokshetau Okrug. According to Speransky's reform, this was now an administrative position within the Russian bureaucracy. Among the Chingissids, only aga sultans were granted hereditary Russian nobility according to the Table of Ranks of the Russian Empire.

However, in 1824, an international diplomatic incident occurred when a delegation from the Qing Empire arrived in the steppe to officially recognize Sultan Gubaidulla as khan. The Russian authorities pressured him into refusing the documents presented by the Qing representatives, and after their envoy's departure, Gubaidulla was detained.

In response to his detention, Sultan Kasym Ablaikhanov, the son of Khan Ablai, wrote a letter to the Russian administration:

Notably, Kasym’s son Kenesary would become the last Kazakh khan to fight for the restoration of Kazakh statehood, simultaneously resisting both the Russian Empire and the Kokand Khanate. Unfortunately, this struggle was doomed to failure—much like Imam Shamil’s resistance in the North Caucasus and Abd al-Qadir’s fight against the French in Algeria around the same time.