THE LITTLE MAN IN THE BIG WAR

In the Middle Ages, participation in war was a fact of life for titled nobility and courtiers. In an era when a vassaliVassal (Fr. servant). In the Middle Ages, this term usually referred to lords who were dependent on the sovereign. In the absence of regular armies, vassal relationships allowed the recruitment of troops. The sovereign granted land or part of his rights to specific territories to his close associates (vassals). In return, vassals were required to appear at the sovereign's call under his banner in case of war and perform other services. knight's primary duty was military service to their lord, staying away from royal campaigns, with rare exceptions, was simply not an option. Being dependent on the favor of the monarch, distinguished knights took part in all the wars waged by the king. As for common people, those distant from the royal court, ‘small people’ in terms of their social status, who constituted the majority of any army, what motivated them to enlist in the royal troops?

While embarking on the first phase of the war, Edward III launched an extensive campaign to demonstrate the legitimacy of his claims over the throne of France. The new royal coat of arms featuring English leopards alongside the French fleur-de-lis appeared on all coins and state seals. At this time, amongst the most effective ways of getting information to most of the population was through the church. Thus, priests delivered sermons explaining the reasons behind the Anglo-French conflict across the parishes of England. Through these sermons, the population was regularly informed about not only the successes of their soldiers but also the constant threats made by the enemy on England. For instance, in 1345, the residents of the southern counties were informed that ‘the King of France is gathering a large army and an enormous fleet to attack our country’. The following year, news was spread in the north about an impending attack by Scottish allies of the French.

In 1351, through various royal proclamations, Edward reminded his people that ‘the King of France continues to amass troops for an invasion of the kingdom of England’. In 1356, dispatched information also referred to a looming danger from the Continent: enemy ships intended to ‘destroy the English fleet and invade our kingdom’. Apart from preparing cities and their inhabitants to resist invaders, which traditionally involved constructing additional defensive structures and strengthening garrisons, the other aim of such warnings was to create an image of an enemy who was not an abstract figure somewhere on the Continent but a real threat to the peaceful population of England. In these royal proclamations, Philip of Valois was initially portrayed as the instigator of the war, having illegally seized someone else’s inheritance, violating the laws of nature and God.

The English frequently argued against the French practice of preventing women from inheriting the crown, referring to the Old Testament story of the daughters of Zelophehad, who had asked Moses for their father’s inheritance. The Lord said to Moses, ‘And you shall speak to the children of Israel, saying: If a man dies and has no son, then you shall cause his inheritance to pass to his daughter’ (Numbers 27:9). However, information about the violations of their king’s rights by France might not have stirred up the masses to fight the enemy, but warnings about imminent attacks on England were meant to provoke a response. Moreover, from the perspective of canonical law,iThat is, ecclesiastical. defending one’s homeland was more justifiable than attacking someone else’s—even under an honorable pretext. This was precisely why Edward invested considerable effort in instilling the fear of French aggression among his subjects.iFor instance, in 1345, residents of the southern counties were alerted that "the King of France is amassing a large army and an enormous fleet to attack our country." The following year, in the north, there was information about the imminent attack by allied French forces on the Scots. In 1351, Edward III reminded everyone that "the King of France continues to gather troops for an invasion of the Kingdom of England." The information circulated in 1356 also pertained to a looming threat from the continent: enemy ships were planning to "destroy the English fleet and invade our kingdom." The purpose of such warnings was to create an image not of an abstract enemy somewhere on the continent violating the king's rights but a real enemy posing a threat to the peaceful population of England. Threats from the enemy could be described vaguely as those ‘inflicting great harm’ or more specifically as ‘murders, plunder, arson, and other crimes’. Occasionally, the enemy’s target or intention was explicitly mentioned, such as the ‘kidnapping of King John’.iThe King of France was captured by the English in 1356 at the Battle of Poitiers. Thus, at times, the fear of a French invasion of England became so great that Londoners began constructing defensive barriers, and wealthy individuals donated significant sums for the purposes of defense.iFor example, the London grocer John Philpot (who held the position of mayor in 1378) repeatedly equipped ships at his own expense and hired armorers to defend the coast of England. The reflection of a real enemy threat is always the strongest incentive for arming, even for those to whom touching weapons was forbidden due to their spiritual status. According to the chronicle of William Thorne from the Abbey of St. Augustine in Canterbury, the local abbot Michael Pichem (died 1386), "who, despite his spiritual office, was very active in the defense of his country, led a strong detachment of his own, as well as other capable people, whom he kept with him and participated in the battle with the enemies near Folkestone, and then near Dover, repelling the enemy in both battles."

In 1340, Edward III issued an ordinanceiIn other words, a royal decree. for the recruitment of warriors of various ranks on a contractual basis. The payment, according to the schedule attached to the ordinance, was more than generous. For instance, any rank of archer received 6 pence per day, which was equivalent to a skilled worker’s earnings. Moreover, leaders of archery units received additional incentive payments every quarter. As a result, a situation where the nobility, while serving in the cavalry, were also actively ‘recruiting agents’, making contracts to supply men for an established fee, quickly developed in England.

The contract specified a list of all military ranks with their respective earnings and periods of service, and were made between the captain (who could be anyone with enough money to hire a band of soldiers) and the king or another military leader. The contract started with the amounts payable for forty days of service, which was then increased based on the agreed-upon term, which could be for nine weeks, a quarter of a year, half a year, a year, or ‘as long as it pleases the king’. Although military service in the royal army was paid well by the contract,iThe contract of Earl Warwick in 1341. The Earl supplied 3 bannerets (knights entitled to unfurl their own banner in battle), 26 knights, 71 men-at-arms, 40 infantry soldiers, and 100 archers. it was only profitable during official military campaigns and when the king had funds, which was not always the case. Consequently, mercenaries often had to seek other sources of income.

For a specific social category, there existed a different type of contract: individuals convicted of serious crimes, such as theft and murder, as well as outlaws, could receive a royal pardon in exchange for participating in the war. At the beginning of the war, Edward III declared that criminals could redeem their sentences through ‘worthy service’ in the name of divine justice.iIt is believed that for the first time in European history, the Romans resorted to replenishing their army with criminals and slaves and promised forgiveness and freedom after their defeat by Hannibal at Cannae in 216 BCE when approximately 60-70 thousand legionaries perished. In 147 BCE, the strategos of the Achaean League, Diaeus, also ordered the release of 12 thousand slaves born in Greece to replenish the army. However, there is an obvious difference between the casuistry of ancient history caused by exceptional circumstances and related to defense, and the decision of Edward III, who needed additional resources for a conquest war. Only the king could grant forgiveness in exchange for service. Despite the hardships of war, many criminals chose to join the military rather than face the gallows. To provide an idea of the number of such soldiers in the English army, it is interesting to look at some figures: in 1339–40, 850 pardons were granted, and in the autumn of 1360 and in 1361, over 260 more were issued. In other words, at different times, criminals comprised between 2 and 12 per cent of the army, with three quarters being convicted of murder.

A significant revenue came from the ransoms of noble prisoners, of which, after 1346, there was a large number in England.iThe first major victory for England. The amounts for these ransoms could sometimes be exorbitant. For example, Sir Thomas Holland received 80,000 florins for the ransom of Count d’Eu.

However, trading prisoners of war had its complexities. Prisoners could die before their ransom was paid or could escape. That is why many would attempt to resell them to other ‘owners’ for smaller but certain amounts. Often, the leaders of expeditions acted as ‘trading agents’, buying noble prisoners from their soldiers and reselling them to the king. At times, multiple parties claimed rights to a prisoner due to the confusion arising in the heat of battle. In the best case, knights capturing a noble lord as a prisoner would agree on a division of the ransom (which could also be resold), but in the worst case, disputes could drag on for years.

Even peasants sought to receive ransoms for their captures. There is a known instance where farmers from Darmund defeated French pirates, capturing many as prisoners, and they were rewarded by the king for it. Apart from extraordinary cases like these, the crown also derived income regularly from this form of military profit.

Having the right to deal with all prisoners without exception, the king would typically declare crowned individuals, blood princes, and other distinguished or famous people as his personal prisoners. Those directly responsible for capturing such prisoners would receive a reward from the king, often amounting to 500 pounds, which was significantly less than the actual ransom paid. Additionally, the crown received a third (sometimes more) of all ransoms paid to its subjects, whether established through formal contracts or informal agreements.

Stories of fortunate warriors becoming rich contributed to the soldiers’ eagerness to seek out and target noblemen wearing lavish armor during battles. To maintain discipline, military commanders had to issue orders prohibiting the guarding of prisoners during combat. In 1415, after the Battle of Agincourt, Henry V recognized the impossibility of advancing through enemy territory with a small and exhausted army, which was also guarding numerous prisoners, who outnumbered them. He ordered the execution of almost all the French captives, sparing only the most distinguished ones.

All English chroniclers unanimously describe the deep sorrow of the victorious army as they faced the prospect of losing their captured loot. It is noteworthy that hardly any common English soldiers managed to keep their war trophies from the Battle of Agincourt. During the march to Calais, the English army endured such hardships that soldiers had to exchange their booty and surviving prisoners for food, leading to an immediate devaluation of such possessions. ‘Many of them released prisoners for a small ransom or let them go on their word of honor, and at that time due to the shortage,iProvisions. they had to give ten nobles instead of four, no matter how much bread cost, as long as they had something to eat.’ A similar situation occurred with John of Gaunt’s army after the Battle of Aljubarrota in 1385. The renowned chronicler Jean Froissart noted that the English were deeply dismayed because they killed prisoners for whom they could have received as much as 400,000 francs.

Traditionally, the advancement of an army across a country was accompanied by acquiring food, plunder, and destruction. The first was necessary to sustain the soldiers themselves. During military operations in regions like Normandy or Aquitaine, the Crown attempted to organize supplies from English lands, but as the troops moved deeper into enemy territory, supplies from England became an unprofitable endeavor. Consequently, the army had to fend for themselves, and the plundering and destruction they wrought became the collateral damage that the higher command turned a blind eye to.

The loot gathered during military campaigns was often sent home by soldiers. The scale of looting was so immense that special ships followed the English army along the coast to transport looted treasures. After capturing the French town of Caen, English soldiers were allowed to take only ‘precious clothing or very valuable adornments’ on their ships, leaving the other spoils to avoid overloading. As noted by an English chronicler, at that time in England, ‘there was no woman without clothes, decorations, or tableware from Caen or Calais, or other overseas cities. In every house, you could see drapes and linen. Married women adorned themselves with the jewelry of French ladies, and if the latter lamented their losses, the former rejoiced in their acquisitions.’ The English sentiments on the matter were most succinctly expressed by the chronicler Thomas Burton after learning of the capture of Calais: ‘And it was the common belief of the people that as long as the English king would strive to conquer the French kingdom, they would prosper and flourish; but their return promised decline and harm.’

After King Edward signed a truce with King John II in Bordeaux in March 1357 and sailed back to England with his army, the fighting in France did not cease, as many Englishmen, realizing the lucrative nature of looting, refused to return home. They were joined by opportunistic individuals from other nations, such as Bretons, Normans, Picardians, and so on.

Sometimes brigandsiBands of marauders. evolved into full-fledged military forces, and their leaders, despite being commoners by birth, could gain fame and honor. The captain of such a brigade had unlimited power over his men—not only did he hold tribunals and distribute booty, but he also chose their objective at his own discretion. For example, Robert Knollys was the captain of a group of brigands whose unit numbered 1,000 men in 1359. In recounting Knollys’ actions, Henry Knighton, a monk from Leicester, emphasized that it was solely through his military talent that he achieved fame and wealth: ‘He was a simple soldier, but over time, he became a great knight and a powerful lord, constable of many castles,iHere, the leader. fortresses, and cities in France, both those given to him by the Duke of Lancaster and those acquired through his own activities when he assembled a large English army and marched across all of France. And he approached the city of Orleans and burned the surrounding areas, killing people at his will, and took away much wealth and treasure that he found there. The citizens did not dare to oppose him—such was the great was, by God’s grace, the glory of the English.’

English authors proudly quote verses composed in France, attesting to the fear the local population had of the formidable Cheshire man. For instance, Knighton claims that the verses included in his chronicle were written at the papal court when Knollys’ troop besieged Avignon, striking terror throughout the papal city:iFrom 1309 to 1377, the residence of the Roman popes was in Avignon (southern modern France). Partly under pressure from France, partly at the whim of the cardinals and the popes themselves, who were burdened by the influence of the Roman nobility on the politics of the Holy See.

‘Robert Knollys, you have humbled France,

Your plundering sword brings misery to all lands.’

According to medieval historians, the image of Robert Knollys—a poor commoner who, owing to his martial prowess and his valor, obtained knighthood, amassed immense wealth, gained the reputation of a hero, and became a source of pride for all of England—became highly appealing to the broader population. The simple looter was transformed into a national hero, whom many of his countrymen admired and aspired to be. Thus, according to various English accounts, joining brigands’ bands was a very reliable way not only to achieve prosperity but also to improve one’s social status. The war promised opportunities that could not fail to attract more and more seekers of glory and easy gains.

Henry Knighton repeatedly emphasized that among those who fought in France, there were plenty of commoners and servants who ‘became experienced knights and returned home as wealthy men’. His senior (though contemporary) and first-hand witness of the described events, Sir Thomas Grey, also noted that the members of the companies ‘were merely a gathering of commoners, young lads whose position until then had been rather insignificant, but who became extremely wealthy and skilled in this type of warfare, which is why young men from many parts of England joined them’.

Few Englishmen achieved benefits of participating in the Hundred Years’ War that were comparable to what Sir John Fastolf gained through his military talents, farsightedness, and entrepreneurship. The inspiration for Shakespeare’s character Falstaff, this descendant of a poor knight from Norfolk had a truly dazzling military career. From 1412 to 1414, under the leadership of the Duke of Clarence, he fought in Gascony, where he demonstrated his brilliant abilities and was rewarded with the positions of Constable of Bordeaux and Captain of Vieure. The war in Normandy made Fastolf a banneretteiThat is a knight with his own standard (Fr. bannière). and a Knight of the Garter,iThe highest order of knighthood in Great Britain founded by Edward III in 1348. the steward of the courti an officer in the medieval household who was responsible for the administration of the lord's estate and the supervision of domestic affairs. of the regent of France, the Duke of Bedford, the governor of the provinces of Maine and Anjou, as well as the Captain of the Bastille.

Owning many estates and houses in the major cities of Normandy, he endeavored to dispose of his properties on the Continent acquired through his service in France, converting them, even at significant losses, into liquid assets with which he then acquired lands in England. In 1445, the annual income from his English possessions amounted to over 1,000 pounds, while the remaining property in France brought in about 400 pounds. The crucial aspect here is not only the absolute amounts but also the ratio of profitability between the properties in England and France. In addition to land, Fastolf invested money in commercial enterprises and purchased precious jewels, and it is not surprising that he not only quickly became one of the wealthiest men in England but also managed to preserve his fortune despite losing Normandy and Gascony.

However, not all war heroes were as farsighted as Fastolf. During times of victories and territorial conquests, few consider how quickly everything will be reclaimed. In 1420, when Henry V was proclaimed the heir and the regent of France by the Treaty of Troyes, no one expected that within thirty years the English would be driven out of Normandy and soon lose Aquitaine as well. The loss of Normandy in 1450, as well as the surrender of Île-de-France, Ponthieu, Maine, and, finally, Guiana in 1453, led to numerous personal tragedies. Englishmen and their supporters expelled from their properties had to adapt to the new conditions of life in the kingdom of France or immigrate to other countries. Crowds of exiles from the ‘inheritance of the Plantagenets’iThe name of the ruling English dynasty. begged Henry VI for a pension as compensation for their lost extensive possessions (acquired for loyal service in France). Thus, in March 1451, the Royal Council in England considered the petition of Esquire Henry Ellis and his wife, who lost their property in Normandy with an annual income of 2,000 francs, and decided to grant them a pension of 100 pounds as compensation.

Despite the defeat, the war in France continued to be associated in the minds of the English with military glory and, more importantly, with the opportunity to enrich oneself through plunder. Decades after the end of the Hundred Years’ War, dreams of replicating the success of Poitiers and Agincourt still stirred the consciousness of the English descendants of heroes of those battles. In 1491, in his speech before the Parliament, dedicated to the beginning of a new Anglo-French war, King Henry VII not only reminded his subjects of his rights to the French crown and called for their support in reclaiming his lawful inheritance, he not only urged them to recall the feats of their ancestors, but also promised rewards from the spoils of French lands: ‘France is not a desert, and I, advocating thriftiness, hope to conduct the campaign in such a way that the war (after the initial days) will pay for itself.’

The peace treaty, concluded immediately after the start of the military campaign, caused, according to the testimony of Francis Bacon, ‘great discontent among the nobility and leading men of the army, many of whom had sold or mortgaged their estates in hopes of military plunder ... And some mocked the words which the king had spoken in the parliament, saying that if the war began, he did not doubt that it would pay for itself. And mockingly they would agree that he kept his word.’

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